A Tale of Two Networks: 
Common Ownership and Product Market Rivalry*

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Abstract
We study the welfare implications of the rise of common ownership in the United States from 1995 to 2021 under a range of different corporate governance models. We build a general equilibrium model with a hedonic demand system in which firms compete in a network game of oligopoly. Firms are connected through two large networks: the first reflects ownership overlap, the second product market rivalry. In our model, common ownership of competing firms induces unilateral incentives to soften competition and the magnitude of the common ownership effect depends on how much the two networks overlap. We estimate our model for the universe of U.S. public corporations using a combination of firm financials, investor holdings, and text-based product similarity data. We perform counterfactual calculations to evaluate how the efficiency and the distributional impact of common ownership have evolved over time. According to our estimates the welfare cost of common ownership, measured as the ratio of deadweight loss to total surplus, has increased about sevenfold between 1995 and 2021. Under various corporate governance models the deadweight loss of common ownership ranges between 3.2% and 11.7% of total surplus in 2021. The rise of common ownership has also resulted in a significant reallocation of surplus from consumers to producers.

JEL Codes: D43, D85, E23, L16, G23, G34

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1 Introduction

Over the last three decades the ownership of corporate equity in the United States has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few large institutional investors (Ben-David, Franzoni, Moussawi and Sedunov, 2020), a trend known as the rise of common ownership (Azar, 2012; Gilje, Gormley and Levit, 2020; Backus, Conlon and Sinkinson, 2021b). Common ownership describes a structure in which which large investors hold significant stakes in several competing firms. The tremendous increase of common ownership has raised concerns among policymakers (see, for example, Phillips (2018) and Vestager (2018)) because it may lessen firms’ economic incentives to aggressively compete against each other. If firms make strategic decisions to maximize the profits accruing to their investors, common ownership can lead firms to (partially) internalize the effect of aggressive market decisions on their competitors’ profits. This may induce firms to produce lower quantities or to charge higher prices, ultimately leading to deadweight and consumer surplus losses. This paper studies the increasing concentration of the network of firm ownership as well its overlap with the network of product market competitors to show that the resulting welfare costs and distributional consequences are significant.

Concerns about the harm of common ownership are supported by a long-standing and growing academic literature, starting with Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), that studies oligopolistic behavior in the presence of common ownership. In response to the secular rise of common ownership and the concurrent surge of empirical research on its anticompetitive effects (see Schmalz (2018) for a recent survey and Shekita (2021) for a collection of specific examples), antitrust authorities and financial regulators around the world (including the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the European Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission) have begun studying policy measures to address them. Despite the enormous academic and policy interest in common ownership, as of today, there has been no attempt to quantify its aggregate welfare impact.

In this paper, we analyze the economy-wide welfare cost and distributional effects of common ownership from a theoretical and empirical perspective. First, we develop a general equilibrium model in which granular, commonly-owned firms compete in a network game of oligopoly. Building on the rich literature on linear-quadratic network games (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2006; Ushchev and Zenou, 2018; Galeotti, Golub and Goyal, 2020), the firms in our model are connected through two large networks: the first reflects ownership overlap, the second product

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1Solomon (2016) reported on an investigation based on Senate testimony by the head of the Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission (2018) featured a hearing on common ownership, and Vestager (2018) disclosed that the European Competition Commission is “looking carefully” at common ownership given indications of its increase and potential for anticompetitive effects. The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice (2022) are currently requesting public comments on how the agencies can modernize enforcement of the antitrust laws regarding mergers including the merger “guidelines” approach to common ownership and horizontal stockholding.” For other recent activity, see OECD (2017), European Competition Commission (2017), and Jackson (2018).
Second, we estimate the model using data on firm financials, text-based product similarity (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016), and institutional investor holdings (Backus et al., 2021b) covering the universe of U.S. publicly listed corporations from 1995 to 2021. We perform counterfactual calculations to evaluate how the efficiency and the distributional impact of common ownership have evolved over this period, finding large negative consumer welfare effects.

Our model has two distinctive features. First, following the literature on hedonic demand (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974) it leverages the Generalized Hedonic-Linear (GHL) demand system recently developed by Pellegrino (2019). This demand system is based on the assumption that there is a representative consumer who has quadratic preferences over product characteristics (as opposed to products). The cross-price elasticity of demand between any two products is thus proportional to a metric of product similarity which captures whether two products contain similar attributes. This setup allows us to estimate, using the dataset of Hoberg and Phillips (2016), realistic cross-price demand elasticities specific to each firm pair and year, without having to take a stance on industry boundaries. Second, firms make strategic supply decisions with the objective of maximizing a weighted sum of profits earned by their investors, with each investor receiving a weight proportional to its ownership stake (Azar, 2012; López and Vives, 2019; Backus et al., 2021b; Azar and Vives, 2021a). This setup is isomorphic to each firm maximizing a weighted sum of its own profits and its competitors’ profits, with each other company receiving a weight proportional to a well-defined measure of common ownership that can be computed using 13(f) institutional investor holdings data. A key feature of our model is that the anticompetitive effects of common ownership depend on the overlap between the two networks of product similarity and common ownership.

Although the increase in common ownership is already well documented and a number of empirical papers have provided evidence for anticompetitive effects of common ownership on prices, quantities, markups, managerial incentives, and profitability, no paper has estimated the economy-wide welfare cost of common ownership. Taking as given that common ownership does affect competitive behavior, how large are the resulting product market welfare costs of the increase in common ownership in the U.S. economy over the past two decades?2 Answering this question requires a model that is both tractable and flexible enough to accommodate the complex overlapping networks of product market competition and ownership that exist among public firms. The principal contribution of our paper is to propose such a model and to practically estimate it with data.

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2Our model and empirical analysis abstract away any labor market effects of common ownership which may result from enhanced employer power as in the theoretical analysis of Azar and Vives (2021a). We further consider neither coordinated anticompetitive effects of common ownership which may result from explicit or tacit collusion between firms or owners as documented by Shekita (2021) nor beneficial effects such as the internalization of innovation spillovers (Antón, Ederer, Giné and Schmalz, 2018; Gibbon and Schain, 2020). We also do not analyze the effect of common ownership on risk-taking and portfolio diversification by financial institutions, which has been studied separately by Galeotti and Ghiglino (2021). Thus, our analysis focuses exclusively on the welfare costs of unilateral product market effects of common ownership.
on product similarity and ownership networks.

We first visualize the two networks of product similarity and common ownership in which firms are embedded. The network of product similarities displays a pronounced community structure. Large groups of firms tend to cluster in certain areas of the network. In contrast, the network of common ownership has a hub-and-spoke structure with a large proportion of firms sharing significant overlap and the remainder of largely unconnected firms at the periphery. Across the distribution of firm pairs there is little correlation between product similarity and common ownership.

Next, we take the model to the data. Our model estimation reveals three broad patterns. First, the welfare costs of common ownership are significant, but not quite as large as the welfare costs of oligopoly. We estimate that in 2021, the most recent year of our sample, the deadweight loss of oligopoly (as measured by the loss in total surplus due to firms competing à la Cournot as opposed to competing as under perfect competition) amounts to about 12.6% of total surplus. Common ownership leads to an additional deadweight loss of 11.7% of total surplus (as measured by the additional loss in total surplus due to firms internalizing overlap in ownership with their competitors when competing à la Cournot). Second, the welfare losses of common ownership fall entirely on consumers. We estimate that in 2021 common ownership raises aggregate profits by $378 billion (from $6.079 trillion to $8.024 trillion), but lowers consumer surplus by $799 billion (from $12.648 trillion to $8.511 trillion). Third, the negative effects of common ownership on total welfare and consumer surplus have grown considerably over the last two decades. Whereas common ownership reduced total surplus by a mere 1.5% in 1995 this deadweight loss increased to 11.7% in 2021. We also document significant redistribution of surplus. Common ownership raised corporate profits by 10.7% in 1995 and by 32% in 2021, but lowered consumer surplus by 4% in 1995 and by 32.7% in 2021.

We further explore how alternative assumptions about corporate governance modify our results. Rather than investors influencing firm decisions exactly in proportion to their ownership stakes, larger investors may exert influence that exceeds the size of their stake. Under such an alternative “superproportional influence” assumption, common ownership has essentially identical effects on deadweight loss, corporate profits, and consumer surplus. When we assume that only blockholders (i.e., shareholders holding 5% or more of a company’s stock) can exert influence or that large diversified owners have limited attention we find that common ownership still leads to a deadweight loss of 9% of total surplus, raises firm profits by almost 18%, and lowers consumer surplus by almost 30% of total surplus in 2021. Even our most conservative estimates which we obtain under a model

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3Several large institutional investors such as BlackRock and TIAA-CREF have also argued for stronger “stakeholder capitalism” which takes the interests of stakeholders other than owners (e.g., employees and consumers) into account and seeks to internalize all the externalities that companies impose on “the society where they work and operate” (Fink, 2020), as well as to support broader goals of social responsibility (Hart and Zingales, 2017; Oehmke and Opp, 2019; Broccardo, Hart and Zingales, 2020). Our analysis builds on the arguably less ambitious assumption that investors influence companies to partially internalize only the effect on product market profits that their corporate conduct imposes on other firms in the same investors’ portfolio.
of corporate governance that recognizes the frictions arising from managerial entrenchment, point
to deadweight losses of around 3% of total surplus. Finally, we show that our conclusions continue
to hold under a number of extensions including the presence of private and foreign firms, multi-
product firms, physical complements, overlap in the consumption baskets of corporate managers
and the representative agent, decreasing returns to scale, and when excluding firms in non-tradable
industries.

Our paper contributes to several literatures. First, it builds on the macroeconomic networks
literature (Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2012; Carvalho, 2014; Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2017; Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019; Liu and Tsyvinski, 2020;
Carvalho, Nirei, Saito and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2021a; Carvalho, Elliott and Spray, 2021b). Whereas
those papers focus on input-output networks we study networks of ownership and product market
rivalry. As a result, our work shares similarities with Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013)
who empirically study innovation spillovers through product market and technology networks, and
with Chen, Zenou and Zhou (2018, 2021) and Galeotti, Golub, Goyal, Talamàs and Tamuz (2021)
who theoretically analyze the role of market structure and market power in networks.

Second, our work is related to the growing body of academic work on markups (De Loecker,
Eeckhout and Unger, 2020; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018; Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson and
Van Reenen, 2020; Döpper, MacKay, Miller and Stiebale, 2021), industry concentration Grullon,
Larkin and Michaely (2019); Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2019); Benkard, Yurukoglu and Zhang
(2021), and, most importantly, the social cost of markups (Edmond, Midrigan and Xu, 2018; Boar
and Midrigan, 2019; Pellegrino, 2019; Baqae and Farhi, 2020).4 By incorporating hedonic demand
as well as data on product market similarity and ownership we characterize competitive interactions
between firms that differ by their productivity as well by their products’ characteristics and their
ownership, including the connections that exist between the latter two features.

Finally, our paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on common ownership. Several em-
pirical papers (Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; Azar, Schmalz and Tecu, 2018; Boller and Scott Mor-
ton, 2020; Newham, Seldeslachts and Banal-Estanol, 2019; Xie and Gerakos, 2020; Li, Liu and
Taylor, 2020; Antón, Ederer, Giné and Schmalz, 2023b; Dennis, Gerardi and Schenone, 2020; El-
dar, Grennan and Waldock, 2020; Lewellen and Lowry, 2021; Azar, Raina and Schmalz, 2021;
Backus, Conlon and Sinkinson, 2021a; Saidi and Streitz, 2021; Azar and Ribeiro, 2022) investigate
whether common ownership affects firm decisions and industry outcomes (e.g., prices, quantities,
markups, entry, managerial compensation, innovation). The evidence is mixed and growing as this
is a very active area of research. Results vary across industries, outcome variables, and the specific
methodologies used to estimate the various effects of common ownership.

Azar and Vives (2021a) theoretically study common ownership in a general equilibrium setting

4To our knowledge the earliest empirical study estimating the deadweight loss resulting from firms’ product market
power in the U.S. economy is Harberger (1954). Other seminal contributions to this literature include Kamerschens
(1966), Bergson (1973), and Cowling and Mueller (1978).
in which symmetric common ownership across identical, symmetrically-differentiated oligopolistic firms leads to additional market power with respect to both product market competition and labor hiring. In contrast to their paper, our theoretical model assumes competitive labor markets to focus on the product market effects of common ownership but allows for arbitrary size differences and substitution patterns between firms. Furthermore, in addition to laying out a theoretical framework, we structurally estimate our model using granular, time-varying firm-by-firm and firm-by-investor network microdata and obtain detailed welfare estimates, including the effect of common ownership on individual firms’ profits.

In sum, a key difference between our study and all previous contributions on common ownership is that we espouse a macro-structural methodological framework that combines theory and data with the objective of answering an entirely distinct research question: Assuming that firms do maximize shareholder value (as opposed to own-firm profits), what are the economy-wide welfare and distributional consequences of common ownership?

By taking a network approach to modelling inter- and intra-industry competition, as predicated by Elliott and Galeotti (2019), we can overcome the problem of external validity (a natural limitation of industry studies), as we compute the welfare impact of common ownership for a broad set of industries. Additionally, because we model the product market as a network, we do not face the problem of having to arbitrarily define the relevant product markets, which is a source of model uncertainty in industry studies. Our analysis shows that, at the aggregate level, common ownership can generate significant distortions and reallocation of surplus—even under conservative assumptions about the effect of common ownership on corporate governance.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 reports the empirical results for the baseline model of corporate governance. Section 5 provides empirical results under a range of different corporate governance models and Section 6 discusses a number of extensions. Section 7 concludes.

2 Theoretical Model

Building on Pellegrino (2019) we develop a general equilibrium model in which granular firms with overlapping ownership compete in a network game of Cournot oligopoly.

2.1 Generalized Hedonic-Linear (GHL) Demand System

There is a representative agent who is a consumer, worker, and owner. This representative agent consumes all the goods produced in the economy, supplies labor as a production input, and receives income from owning shares of the firms in the economy.

Our economy has \( n \) firms, indexed by \( i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \). Each firm produces a single differentiated product such that there are \( n \) products in the economy. The representative agent has hedonic demand (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974) and thus values each product as a bundle of its constituent
Each product has two types of characteristics: \( m \) common characteristics indexed by \( \iota \in \{1, 2, \ldots, m\} \) and one of \( n \) idiosyncratic characteristics. We assume that firms’ product characteristics are exogenously given. Neither the product market nor firms’ ownership structure influence the product positioning of firms. The \( m \)-dimensional column vector \( \mathbf{a}_i \) describes product \( i \) where the scalar \( a_{\iota i} \) is the number of units of common characteristic \( \iota \) of product \( i \). The column vector \( \mathbf{a}_i \) is of unit length:

\[
\mathbf{a}_i = \begin{bmatrix} a_{1i} & a_{2i} & \ldots & a_{mi} \end{bmatrix}' \quad \text{such that} \quad \sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{\iota j}^2 = 1 \quad \forall \ i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \quad (2.1)
\]

We combine the product-specific vectors \( \mathbf{a}_i \) of common characteristics in the \( m \times n \) matrix \( \mathbf{A} \):

\[
\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{a}_1 & \mathbf{a}_2 & \cdots & \mathbf{a}_n \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & \cdots & a_{1n} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & \cdots & a_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ a_{m1} & a_{m2} & \cdots & a_{mn} \end{bmatrix} \quad (2.2)
\]

The representative agent consumes \( q_i \) units of the good produced by firm \( i \). The \( n \)-dimensional vector \( \mathbf{q} \) contains the quantities of the \( n \) firms in the economy and is given by

\[
\mathbf{q} = \begin{bmatrix} q_1 & q_2 & \cdots & q_n \end{bmatrix}' \quad (2.3)
\]

An allocation is a vector \( \mathbf{q} \) that specifies how many units \( q_i \) of each good \( i \) are produced. The total units \( x_j \) of common characteristic \( j \) consumed by the representative agent are given by

\[
x_j = \sum_i a_{\iota j} q_i \quad (2.4)
\]

so that \( \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{q} \) (i.e., the matrix \( \mathbf{A} \) converts units of goods \( \mathbf{q} \) into the vector of consumed common characteristics \( \mathbf{x} \)). Each unit of good \( i \) contains exactly one unit of its own idiosyncratic characteristic and hence \( \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{q} \) (i.e., the vector of consumed idiosyncratic characteristics \( \mathbf{y} \) is equal to the vector of consumed quantities \( \mathbf{q} \)).

The representative agent has a utility function which is quadratic in common and idiosyncratic characteristics of the products consumed, and suffers a linear disutility for the total number of work

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5 More recently, Pellegrino (2019) and Eeckhout and Veldkamp (2021) use similar hedonic-linear demand systems that model goods as bundles of attributes to study the welfare consequences of market power.
hours $H$. The utility function is therefore given by

$$U(x, q, H) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \alpha \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{m} \left( b^x_j x_j - \frac{1}{2} x_j^2 \right) + (1 - \alpha) \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( b^y_i y_i - \frac{1}{2} y_i^2 \right) - H \quad (2.5)$$

where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is the utility weight of common characteristics relative to idiosyncratic characteristics which provides an additional degree of horizontal differentiation between products. If $\alpha = 0$, the consumer only cares about idiosyncratic characteristics and all the firms in the economy are monopolists producing independent products. In contrast, if $\alpha = 1$ the consumer’s utility only depends on common characteristics.\(^6\) $b^x_j$ and $b^y_i$ are preference shifters for common and idiosyncratic characteristics. We close the general equilibrium model by making leisure the outside good.

The representative agent purchases and consumes the goods bundle $q$ taking prices $p$ as given, receives labor income $H$ and also receives the aggregate profits $\Pi = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \pi$ from holding shares of all the companies in the economy.\(^7\) The agent’s budget constraint is thus given by

$$H + \Pi \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i q_i. \quad (2.6)$$

Labor is the numéraire of this economy. The consumer’s demand function $q(p)$ maximizes the consumer surplus function

$$CS(q) = q' (b - p) - \frac{1}{2} q' \left[ I + \alpha (A'A - I) \right] q \quad (2.7)$$

where

$$b \overset{\text{def}}{=} \alpha A'b^x + (1 - \alpha) b^y. \quad (2.8)$$

$a'_i a_j$ is the cosine similarity between $i$ and $j$ and ranges from 0 to 1. The cosine similarities between all firm pairs are contained in the matrix $A'A$. When two products overlap more in the characteristics space, they have a higher cosine similarity and are more substitutable.

Define the following symmetric matrix

$$\Sigma \overset{\text{def}}{=} \alpha (A'A - I). \quad (2.9)$$

and let its entries be denoted by $\sigma_{ij}$. The diagonal elements $\sigma_{ii}$ of $\Sigma$ are equal to 0 and the off-diagonal elements $\sigma_{ij}$ are bounded between 0 and $\alpha$. In the limit case where $\sigma_{ij} = 0$, the two products are maximally differentiated and independent because they share no characteristics. If,

\(^6\)The idiosyncratic characteristics of our setup can be thought of as characteristics not observed by the econometrician. If $\alpha = 1$, the substitution patterns between products are perfectly tied down by the matrix of cosine similarities $A'A$ and its empirical equivalent provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2016) without any additional degree of freedom. $\alpha < 1$ provides an additional degree of freedom.

\(^7\)We specify the exact ownership arrangements in Section 2.3.
in contrast, $\sigma_{ij} = \alpha$, the two products are maximally substitutable and have exactly the same common characteristics. They are only differentiated to the extent that the consumer cares about idiosyncratic characteristics. If, in addition, the consumer only cares about common characteristics (i.e., $\alpha = 1$), these two products are perfect substitutes. Because the $A'A$ matrix mechanically only has positive entries the resulting $\Sigma$ matrix only has positive (off-diagonal) entries. Thus, our setup does not allow for physical complements which would be represented by negative off-diagonal elements in $A'A$ and $\Sigma$.

The resulting demand and inverse demand functions are

\[
\text{Aggregate demand : } \quad q = (I + \Sigma)^{-1} (b - p) \quad (2.10)
\]
\[
\text{Inverse demand : } \quad p = b - (I + \Sigma)q \quad (2.11)
\]

\section*{2.2 Labor Demand and Product Supply}

Each firm $i$ produces output $q_i$ by using labor $h_i$. The labor market clearing condition is given by $H = \sum_i h_i$. Because labor is the numéraire, the total cost of firm $i$ is equal to the labor input $h_i$. We focus on the case where the cost function is quadratic because this setup yields closed-form solutions

\[
\begin{align*}
    h_i(q_i) &= f_i + c_i^0 q_i + \frac{\delta_i}{2} q_i^2 \\
    c_i &= c_i^0 + \delta_i q_i
\end{align*}
\]

where $f_i$ and $c_i$ are firm $i$’s fixed and marginal costs and $c_i^0$ is the marginal cost intercept. We assume that fixed costs are sunk and paid in labor.

Each firm’s production decision affects the prices of all the other products in the economy. Specifically, the derivative $\partial p_i / \partial q_j$ is proportional to the cosine similarity $a_i'a_j$. The more similar firms $i$ and $j$ are in terms of their product characteristics, the larger this derivative is in absolute value. Because of the symmetry of $A'A$, we have $\partial q_i / \partial p_j = \partial q_j / \partial p_i$.

The profits $\pi_i$ of firm $i$ are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_i(q) &= p_i(q) \cdot q_i - h_i(q) \\
    &= q_i b_i - q_i^2 - \sum_{j \neq i} \sigma_{ij} q_i q_j - h_i. \quad (2.13)
\end{align*}
\]

\section*{2.3 Ownership and Firm Objective Function}

There are $Z$ investment funds indexed by $z$ through which the representative agent invests in the firms in the economy. $V_z$, the value of fund $z$, is the sum of the profits that the fund is entitled to based on its ownership shares

\[
V_z \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{iz} \pi_i \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} = 1 \quad (2.14)
\]
where \( s_{iz} \) is the proportion of shares of company \( i \) owned by fund \( z \). Following Rotemberg (1984), we assume that firm \( i \) maximizes \( \phi_i \), which is the sum of all investment funds’ value functions, weighted by their respective ownership shares in firm \( i \):

\[
\phi_i \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} V_z = \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} \sum_{j=1}^{n} s_{jz} \pi_j = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi_j \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} s_{jz}.
\]  

(2.15)

We rewrite the right-hand side as a weighted sum of all firms’ profits by substituting \( V_z \) from equation (2.14).

Define the common ownership weights \( \kappa_{ij} \) as

\[
\kappa_{ij} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{s_i' s_j}{s_i s_i'}
\]  

(2.16)

where

\[
s_i \overset{\text{def}}{=} \left[ s_{i1} \quad s_{i2} \ldots \quad s_{iZ} \right]'
\]  

(2.17)

This allows us to rewrite firm \( i \)'s objective function\(^9\) as

\[
\phi_i \propto \pi_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \kappa_{ij} \pi_j.
\]  

(2.18)

We interpret \( \kappa_{ij} \) as the weight—due to common ownership by investment funds—that each firm \( i \)'s objective function assigns to the profits of other firms relative to its own profits. It corresponds to what Edgeworth (1881) termed the “coefficient of effective sympathy among firms.” This objective function also nests standard Cournot competition (\( \kappa_{ij} = 0 \) for \( i \neq j \)) and (multi-product) monopoly (\( \kappa_{ij} = 1 \) for \( i \neq j \)) as its limit cases. The \( n \times n \) matrix \( K \) contains the bilateral common ownership weights for all the firms in the entire economy

\[
K = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & \kappa_{12} & \cdots & \kappa_{1n} \\
\kappa_{21} & 1 & \cdots & \kappa_{2n} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\kappa_{n1} & \kappa_{n2} & \cdots & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]  

(2.19)

The firms engage in Cournot competition. We assume that the firms’ profit functions are

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\(^8\)We assume that ownership allocations are exogenous as is standard in the literature. This assumption is further justified by recent theoretical work on endogenous ownership by Piccolo and Schneemeier (2020). They predict that, in the presence of noise traders and investment costs, common ownership will arise through investors’ endogenous trading in a way that is unpredictable based on the structure of product markets (i.e., there are multiple equilibria with varying degrees of common ownership).

\(^9\)Our notation for the firm’s objective function follows Backus et al. (2021b) and Antón et al. (2023b). López and Vives (2019) and Azar and Vives (2021a) use the same structure but denote \( \kappa_{ij} \) by \( \lambda_{ij} \).
concave. To maximize $\phi_i$, firm $i$ sets the following derivative with respect to $q_i$ equal to zero:

$$\frac{\partial \phi_i}{\partial q_i} = \frac{\partial \pi_i}{\partial q_i} + \sum_{j \neq i} \kappa_{ij} \frac{\partial \pi_j}{\partial q_i}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.20)

In line with much of the common ownership literature, we focus on unilateral effects (Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright and Tirole, 2003b) and do not consider coordinated effects (Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright and Tirole, 2003a) of common ownership (e.g., increased incentives and ability to collude). That is to say, we do not assume that firms with overlapping ownership can successfully coordinate their behavior in an anticompetitive way, for example, by lowering quantities.

At this point it is worth discussing our assumption that firm $i$ (or the manager of firm $i$) maximizes $\phi_i$. First, there is a long tradition in economics of weighting shareholder interests in the objective function of the firm, including Drèze (1974), Grossman and Hart (1979), and Rotemberg (1984). Second, more recently, the common ownership literature has used the same objective function for firms as in equation (2.18) with Azar (2020) providing microeconomic foundations for the firm manager’s maximization choice.

However, this assumption that firms maximize the weighted portfolio profits of their investors differs from Azar and Vives (2021a). They instead assume a two-class economy with worker-consumers and owner-consumers, in which firms maximize the weighted utilities of their owner-consumers. In their model, firms are assumed to take into account that their strategic decisions affect both their investors’ portfolio profits and their investors’ consumption choices through the firm quantities’ influence on the aggregate price index. For example, under the latter part of this assumption airlines internalize that some of its investors are also air travelers and setting higher quantities lowers the relative price of air travel in the consumption bundle of these owner-consumers which directly benefits them.

In contrast, in our model firms only internalize all effects on investors’ portfolio profits but ignore the impact (of the production quantity choices) on the consumption bundles of their investors. First, we believe that this assumption is a better description of what firms actually do. In an economy with many diverse consumer-owners who consume changing baskets of goods it would be exceedingly difficult for those at the helm of firms to keep track of the impact of strategic decisions on investor utilities. Second, it is likely that the consumption bundles of firm managers and other consumers in the economy differ significantly. For example, Bertrand and Kamenica (2018) document that the divergence in consumer behavior is fairly constant over time and larger than other cultural distances such as media diet, time use, or social attitudes. Assume, therefore, that there are two types of agents: corporate managers and consumer-workers. The strategic decisions of each firm $i$

---

10Oligopoly deadweight losses, markups, and misallocations arise because of a conflict between classes. At a fundamental level, this is because the agents that are in charge of production, consume a different set of goods from the rest, and therefore do not internalize how their choices affect the real income of other agents. In Azar and Vives (2021a) the two-class divide between worker-consumers and owner-consumers is the source of the anticompetitive labor market effect of common ownership.
are in the hands of a manager (also indexed by $i$). We assume that the manager’s compensation $\omega_i$ depends on investment funds’ portfolio profits and is equal to

$$\omega_i = \varepsilon \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} V_z$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.21)

with $\varepsilon$ arbitrarily small. Managers have increasing utility over and spend all of their income on a “luxury” good (e.g., yachts or private jets)\(^{11}\) indexed by 0, which is produced competitively with a linear technology using only labor. Let $q_{i0}$ denote the quantity of the luxury good purchased by the manager of firm $i$, $p_0$ the price, and $h_0$ the total work. We then have the following market clearing condition for the production of good 0

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I} q_{i0} = h_0$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.22)

and the price $p_0$ is one by construction. The assumption of $\varepsilon$ being arbitrarily small implies that the labor used to produce the luxury good 0 is a negligible share of total labor in the economy.

\subsection*{2.4 Equilibrium, Market Structure, and Ownership Counterfactuals}

We estimate our theoretical model to analyze how total surplus, profits, and consumer surplus depend on market structure, ownership allocations, and firm conduct. Our baseline assumption is that firms compete as in an economy-wide Cournot oligopoly game in which the manager of each firm $i$ maximizes the objective function $\phi_i$ and which yields the Cournot Common Ownership (CCO) allocation $q^\phi_i$. For this baseline scenario we assume an interior solution motivated by the fact that in the observed allocation all firms produce strictly positive output. For the counterfactual scenarios we maximize the potential functions outlined below subject to a non-negativity constraint.

We obtain the Cournot Common Ownership allocation $q^\phi_i$ by solving the system of first order conditions given by

$$0 = (b - c^0) - (2I + \Delta + \Sigma + K \circ \Sigma) q$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.23)

where

$$\Delta \overset{\text{def}}{=} \begin{bmatrix} \delta_1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \delta_2 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & \delta_n \end{bmatrix}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.24)

The diagonal matrix $\Delta$ contains the slopes of the firms’ marginal cost functions and therefore captures firm-specific economies of scale. $\Sigma$ and $K$ are the adjacency matrices of the networks of product rivalry and common ownership. Specifically, $K$ is the $n \times n$ common ownership matrix of

\footnote{This setup is reminiscent of Veblen (1899) because these agents engage in (conspicuous) consumption that is distinct from the basket of goods consumed by the representative worker-consumer.}
κ_{ij} for all \( n \) firms in the economy and \( \circ \) denotes the Hadamard (element-by-element) product. \( b \) and \( c^0 \) are the demand and supply function intercepts. Thus, the Cournot Common Ownership allocation \( q^\phi \) is given by

\[
q^\phi = (2I + \Delta + \Sigma + K \circ \Sigma)^{-1} (b - c^0).
\]

We can now consider counterfactual scenarios in which firms make production decisions with alternative objective functions. For example, rather than maximizing portfolio profits \( \phi_i \) firms maximize their own individual firm profits \( \pi_i \) as under standard Cournot competition. Each of these counterfactuals, summarized in the set of equations in (2.26), is the maximizer of a specific potential function.\(^\text{12}\)

Given our setup, we can implicitly define a linear-quadratic network game (Ballester et al., 2006) by taking the profit vector as a payoff function and the vector of quantities \( q \) as a strategy profile. Loosely speaking, this is because the combination of the matrices \( \Sigma \) (the network of product market rivalry relationships based on the firms’ product substitutabilities) and \( K \) (the network of ownership relationships based on the firms’ investor shares) is essentially the adjacency matrix of a weighted network. Linear-quadratic network games like ours belong to a larger class of games known as “potential games” (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) because they can be described by a scalar function which is called the game’s potential.

Let us define the following three potential functions corresponding to Aggregate Profit \( \Pi (q) \), Cournot \( \Psi (q) \), and Total Surplus \( W (q) \). These potential functions capture different assumptions about how firms behave and are inversely ranked by their level of competitiveness.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Aggregate Profit} & : \quad \Pi (q) = q' (b - c^0) - \frac{1}{2} q' (2I + \Delta + 2\Sigma) q - F \\
\text{Cournot Potential} & : \quad \Psi (q) = q' (b - c^0) - \frac{1}{2} q' (2I + \Delta + \Sigma) q - F \\
\text{Total Surplus} & : \quad W (q) = q' (b - c^0) - \frac{1}{2} q' (I + \Delta + \Sigma) q - F
\end{align*}
\]

where \( F \) is defined as \( \sum_i^n f_i \).

By maximizing the potential functions in (2.26) we obtain the equilibrium allocations \( q \) that result under three alternative scenarios of firm behavior. The least competitive allocation is Monopoly. In this setting a single investment fund controls the quantity decisions of all firms in the economy and jointly maximizes the firms’ aggregate profits. The derivation of these potential functions (including the proof that its maximizers are the equilibria under different assumptions of firm behavior) appear in Pellegrino (2019).

\(^\text{12}\)For our theoretical analysis of these counterfactual scenarios, we assume an interior solution for the closed-form expressions of each \( q \). For our empirical analysis, we also compute numerical solutions with a non-negativity constraint on each \( q \). The non-negativity constraint binds for very few firms and the solution is almost identical to the unconstrained solution (e.g., error < 0.1% for the total surplus function).
**Definition 1.** The *Monopoly* allocation $q^\Pi$ is defined as the maximizer of the aggregate profit function $\Pi(q)$:

$$q^\Pi \overset{\text{def}}{=} \arg \max_q \Pi(q) = (2I + \Delta + 2\Sigma)^{-1}(b - c^0) \quad (2.27)$$

This allocation is the limit of a Cournot equilibrium with common ownership in which all of the profit weights tend to one (i.e., $\kappa_{ij} \to 1$).

Under standard *Cournot* competition there are no common ownership effects. Each firm $i$ maximizes $\pi_i$ without any regard for the profit impact of its production decisions on other firms because there is no overlap in the shareholdings of investment funds across firms.

**Definition 2.** The *Cournot* allocation $q^\Psi$ is defined as that in which all profit weights $\kappa_{ij}$ in $K$ are equal to 0 for $i \neq j$:

$$q^\Psi \overset{\text{def}}{=} \arg \max_q \Psi(q) = (2I + \Delta + \Sigma)^{-1}(b - c^0) \quad (2.28)$$

Finally, in the *Perfect Competition* scenario firms behave as if they are atomistic producers pricing all units at marginal cost. This maximizes total (and also consumer) surplus.

**Definition 3.** The *Perfect Competition* allocation $q^W$ is defined as the maximizer of the aggregate total surplus function $W(q)$:

$$q^W \overset{\text{def}}{=} \arg \max_q W(q) = (I + \Delta + \Sigma)^{-1}(b - c^0) \quad (2.29)$$

### 3 Data, Identification, and Validation

To estimate the model presented in Section 2 we need to map the various theoretical concepts to observed and identified variables and parameters. Table 1 documents how the variables in our model correspond to data, including the sources of these data.

#### 3.1 Cost Function

In the baseline model we assume that the marginal cost slope all firms $\delta_i$ is equal to zero. Each firm therefore faces an exogenous constant marginal cost $c_i = c_i^0$, but this marginal cost differs across firms. The constant returns to scale assumption is common in many empirical industrial organization studies including Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2001), and Goeree (2008). We relax this assumption in Section 6.5 where we allow for positive $\delta_i$ and thus decreasing returns to scale.

#### 3.2 Firm Financials

We measure revenues ($p_iq_i$), variable costs ($\text{TVC}_i$), and fixed costs ($f_i$) in our model by using data from Compustat. These variables correspond to accounting revenues, Costs of Goods Sold
(COGS), and Selling General and Administrative (SGA) costs, respectively. We follow De Loecker et al. (2020) in excluding firms with negative revenues or costs of goods sold, or negative gross margin (revenues less COGS). By definition, we have $\pi_i = p_iq_i - TVC_i - f_i$ which allows us to observe firm profits.

In order to make the welfare metrics comparable over time, we deflate dollar amounts by the hourly labor compensation in non-farm business (COMPNFB in FRED), indexed at the level of 2021. Hourly labor compensation is the correct deflator in our context for several reasons. First, goods prices incorporate welfare-relevant information about goods quality. Second, labor is the only commodity that is not subject to quality changes and that is supplied at a constant marginal utility cost. Third, it is the numéraire of our economy. Fourth, it provides an intuitive interpretation for the deflated dollar amounts in terms of units of leisure.

3.3 Text-Based Product Similarity

The matrix of product similarities $A'A$ is one of two crucial network inputs that are required to estimate our model. Hoberg and Phillips (2016, henceforth HP) provide an empirical estimate of this input. They compute time-varying product cosine similarities for firms in Compustat by analyzing the text of the firms’ 10-K forms. Every 10-K form contains a business description section, which is the target of the algorithm devised by HP. HP build a vocabulary of 61,146 words that firms use to describe their products, and that identify product characteristics. For each firm $i$, HP use this vocabulary to construct a vector of word occurrences $v_i$:

$$v_i = \begin{bmatrix} v_{i,1} \\ v_{i,2} \\ \vdots \\ v_{i,61146} \end{bmatrix}$$

(3.1)

HP normalize this vector by dividing by the Euclidean norm which yields the empirical counterpart of $a_i$:

$$a_i = \frac{v_i}{||v_i||}.$$ 

(3.2)

All $a_i$ vectors are dot-multiplied to obtain $A'A$:

$$A'A = \begin{bmatrix} a_1'a_1 & a_1'a_2 & \cdots & a_1'a_n \\ a_2'a_1 & a_2'a_2 & \cdots & a_2'a_n \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ a_n'a_1 & a_n'a_2 & \cdots & a_n'a_n \end{bmatrix}$$

(3.3)

\footnote{HP limit attention to nouns that appear in no more than 25 percent of all product descriptions in order to avoid common words. They also omit geographical terms as well as common words that are used by more than 25 percent of all firms.}
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Mapping to Data

Panel A: Observed Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p_iq_i$</td>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVC$_i$</td>
<td>Total Variable Costs</td>
<td>Costs of Goods Sold</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_i$</td>
<td>Fixed Costs</td>
<td>Selling, General and Administrative Costs</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_i'a_j$</td>
<td>Product Cosine Similarity</td>
<td>Word frequencies in 10-K Business Description</td>
<td>Hoberg and Phillips (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_i$</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Number of shares divided by total shares outstanding</td>
<td>SEC 13(f) filings, Compustat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Identified Variables and Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_i$</td>
<td>Marginal Cost Slope</td>
<td>$= 0$ in baseline model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>Utility Weight on Common Characteristics</td>
<td>$= 0.12$ using Nevo (2001) as in Pellegrino (2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q_i$</td>
<td>Output</td>
<td>$\mathbf{q} \text{ such that } \pi + \mathbf{f} = \text{diag} (\mathbf{q}) (\mathbf{I} + \frac{1}{2} \Delta + \mathbf{K} \circ \Sigma) \mathbf{q}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_i^0$</td>
<td>Marginal Cost Intercept</td>
<td>$= \frac{b_i}{q_i} - \frac{1}{2} \delta_i q_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\mathbf{I} + \Sigma)$</td>
<td>$\partial \mathbf{p} / \partial \mathbf{q}$</td>
<td>$= (1 - \alpha) \mathbf{I} + \alpha \mathbf{A}' \mathbf{A}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathbf{b}$</td>
<td>Demand Intercept</td>
<td>$= (2 \mathbf{I} + \Delta + \Sigma + \mathbf{K} \circ \Sigma) \mathbf{q} + \mathbf{c}^0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To the extent that the word frequencies in the vocabulary constructed by HP correctly represent product characteristics, this matrix is the exact empirical counterpart to $A^\prime A$—the matrix of cross-price effects in our theoretical model. Because each U.S. publicly listed firm must file a 10-K form the matrix of estimated product similarities provides a singularly comprehensive description of competitive interactions. It also covers the near entirety (97.8%) of the CRSP-Compustat universe.\footnote{One of HP’s objectives in developing this dataset is to remedy two well-known shortcomings of the traditional industry classifications: (i) the inability to capture imperfect substitutability between products, which is the most salient feature of our model; and (ii) the fact that commonly used industry classifications, such as SIC and NAICS, are based on similarity in \textit{production processes}, rather than in product characteristics. In other words, they are appropriate for estimating production functions, but unsuitable for proxying for the elasticity of substitution between different products.}

Our setup assumes that word frequencies in 10-K product descriptions ($v_i$) can proxy for product characteristics ($a_i$). This is a strong assumption that we validate empirically. However, we only map \textit{common} characteristics to the vocabulary of Hoberg and Phillips (2016). The idiosyncratic characteristics are instead assumed to be \textit{unobserved}. The presence of the idiosyncratic characteristics therefore adds a degree of freedom to the demand system—the parameter $\alpha$—which is used in Pellegrino (2019) and in our analysis to calibrate the overall magnitude of the cross-price elasticities.

### 3.4 Ownership Data

Constructing detailed ownership data, even for the largest publicly listed U.S. companies such as the constituents of the S&P500, is not without obstacles as noted by Backus et al. (2021b). This process is substantially more difficult for the entire universe of publicly listed U.S. firms which we cover in the present paper. In order to calculate the matrix of common ownership profit weights $K$, we require the matrix of ownership shares $S$. We obtain $S$ from two datasets of mutual fund holdings reported in form 13(f) filings. Form 13(f) is a mandatory filing of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in which institutional investors with assets under management (AUM) in excess of $100$ million are required to report their holdings of U.S. securities, including those of all U.S. public corporations.

Our data covers the period from 1995 to 2021. For the years 1999 to 2017 we use a dataset constructed by Backus et al. (2021b) who parsed the data contained in 13(f) forms. For the remaining years, we use 13(f) data from Thomson Reuters, obtained through the WRDS platform. We merge this data, using CUSIP codes, to the total amount of shares outstanding provided, for each firm, in Compustat. By dividing the shareholdings of individual investors by the total number of shares outstanding, we obtain the normalized shares vector $s_i$. We then use equation (2.16) to compute the matrix of profit weights $K$.

We use a statistical correction to account for the presence of unobserved investors without which
we would obtain a thick right tail of implausibly large $\kappa_{ij}$. To do so, we first rewrite $\kappa_{ij}$ as

$$
\kappa_{ij} = \frac{s_i's_j}{\text{IHHI}_i}
$$

(3.4)

where $\text{IHHI}_i = \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz}^2$ is the investor Herfindahl concentration index. Denote the set of observed and of unobserved investors by $O$ and $U$, respectively. The denominator of the vector $s_i$, which is the total number of shares, includes both observed and unobserved investors because it is taken from Compustat. Hence, typically, the observed $s_{iz}$ will sum to a value less than one. All the diagonal $\kappa_{ii}$ are equal to one by construction and hence we can focus on the $i \neq j$ case. Under the (conservative) assumption that there is zero overlap in ownership between $i$ and $j$ among unobserved investors we have

$$
\sum_{z \in U} s_{iz}s_{jz} = 0.
$$

(3.5)

Thus, we can compute the numerator of the equation above by simply ignoring the unobserved investors.

Estimating the denominator is slightly more complex. If we compute the IHHI using observed investors only we obtain

$$
\hat{\text{IHHI}}_i = \sum_{k \in O} s_{iz}^2
$$

(3.6)

which is a downwardly biased estimate of the IHHI. For some firms, where few small investors are observed, this bias can be enormous, leading $\kappa$ to exceed 10,000. Let us write the “true” IHHI as

$$
\text{IHHI}_i^* = \sum_{z \in O} s_{iz}^2 + \sum_{z \in U} s_{iz}^2.
$$

(3.7)

Let $S_i(O)$ and $S_i(U)$ be the sum of shares for the observed and unobserved investors, respectively:

$$
S_i(O) = \sum_{z \in O} s_{iz}, \quad S_i(U) = \sum_{z \in U} s_{iz}
$$

(3.8)

Let $s_{i(O)k}$ and $s_{i(U)k}$ be the shares owned by investor $k$ as a share of the observed and unobserved ones, respectively:

$$
\frac{1}{S_i(O)} \cdot \sum_{z \in O} s_{iz} \quad \frac{1}{S_i(U)} \cdot \sum_{z \in U} s_{iz}
$$

(3.9)

As a result, we have

$$
\text{IHHI}_i^* = \sum_{z \in O} (s_{i(O)} \cdot s_{i(O)k})^2 + \sum_{z \in U} (s_{i(U)} \cdot s_{i(U)k})^2
$$

$$
= S_{i(O)}^2 \cdot \sum_{z \in O} s_{i(O)k}^2 + S_{i(U)}^2 \cdot \sum_{z \in U} s_{i(U)z}^2
$$

$$
= S_{i(O)}^2 \cdot \text{IHHI}_i^O + S_{i(U)}^2 \cdot \text{IHHI}_i^U
$$

(3.10)
where we have rewritten the terms in summation as the Herfindahl index among *observed* and *unobserved* investors only. By making the assumption that ownership concentration is identical among unobserved and observed investors ($\text{IIHI}_i^\text{U} = \text{IIHI}_i^\text{O}$), and using the fact that

$$S_{i(O)} = 1 - S_{i(O)}$$

the true Herfindahl index can be rewritten as

$$\text{IIHI}_i^* = \left[ S_{i(O)}^2 + (1 - S_{i(O)})^2 \right] \cdot \text{IIHI}_i^\text{O}$$

$$= \left[ S_{i(O)}^2 + (1 - S_{i(O)})^2 \right] \cdot \sum_{i \in \mathcal{O}} \left( \frac{1}{S_{i(O)}} s_i \right)^2$$

$$= \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1 - S_{i(O)}}{S_{i(O)}} \right)^2 \right] \cdot \hat{\text{IIHI}}_i$$

(3.12)

where the term in square brackets is the correction we apply to our estimates of the denominator of $\kappa_{ij}$.

The fact that we correct the numerator upward while not correcting the numerator ($s'_i s_j$) implies that our estimate of $\kappa_{ij}$ provides a lower bound because including the unobserved investors in the summation can only increase the value of the numerator. This in turn implies that our estimates of the welfare impact of common ownership are, by construction, conservative.

Although we think that a more conservative estimate is preferable, there are also downsides. If 13(f) data coverage of institutional shareholdings improved or worsened over time (which is possible but hard to verify), there is a possibility that the downward bias in the numerator (which we chose to tolerate in order to be conservative) might have become smaller or larger over time. This could potentially bias the time trend of our estimates.

If we chose to correct *both* the numerator and the denominator, we would (mechanically) obtain a larger welfare impact from common ownership but also potentially a different trend. A similar derivation as the one we used for the denominator leads to the following correction for the numerator

$$(s'_i s_j)^* = \left[ 1 + \frac{(1 - S_i) (1 - S_j)}{S_i S_j} \right] (s'_i s_j)^\text{O}. \quad (3.13)$$

### 3.5 Identification and Calibration

The remaining variables of our model are unobserved. However, we now show that they are identified subject to knowing $\alpha$ and $\Delta$.

To identify $q$ we write the vector of firm profits $\pi$ and fixed costs $f$ in terms of the quantity vector $q$ and the matrices $\Delta$, $\Sigma$, $K$

$$\pi + f = \text{diag}(q) \left( I + \frac{1}{2} \Delta + K \circ \Sigma \right) q$$

(3.14)
and then find the quantity vector $q$ that satisfies this equation.\textsuperscript{15}

$q_i$ in turn determines the vector of prices and the cost function intercepts:

$$p_i = \frac{p_i q_i}{q_i} \quad \text{and} \quad c_i^0 = \frac{TVC_i}{q_i} - \frac{\delta_i}{2} q_i$$

Next we can obtain the demand intercepts $b_i$ using equation (2.28)

$$b = (2I + \Delta + \Sigma + K \circ \Sigma) q + c^0.$$  (3.16)

The last step required to take the model to the data is to determine $\alpha$, which controls the elasticity of substitution among products. Several well-known demand estimation studies (Berry et al., 1995; Nevo, 2001; Goeree, 2008) assume that marginal costs are exogenous and flat, $c_i = c_i^0$ because $\delta_i = 0$ for all firms $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$. For our baseline model we also adopt this assumption. As a result, we can now identify $\alpha$ provided that we can observe the inverse cross-price demand elasticity for at least one product pair. There are, of course, many candidate pairs of firms for which there exists an estimate of the inverse cross-price elasticities from other studies. We follow Pellegrino (2019) which uses the cross-price elasticity between two firms from the seminal study of the ready-to-eat cereal industry by Nevo (2001) and pins down $\alpha = 0.12$.

3.6 Validation

3.6.1 Network Structure of Product Markets

Hoberg and Phillips (2016) and Pellegrino (2019) show that the cosine product similarity data obtained from 10-K product descriptions successfully identify product market rivalries, in both broad markets as well as narrow markets, capture the community structure of product market networks (see also Figure 2 discussed in Section 4.1.1), and are superior to all other existing economy-wide measures of industry classification. Their results validate our assumption that word frequencies in 10-K product descriptions $v_i$ can proxy for product characteristics $a_i$.

However, even though product similarities can identify competitive interactions it is not clear whether the GHL demand system using HP’s cosine similarity data produces realistic demand elasticities or markups. We now show that this is indeed the case.

3.6.2 Demand Estimates

To establish the validity of the GHL demand system, we compare GHL demand elasticity estimates with those from landmark industrial organization studies on automobiles (Berry et al., 1995),

\textsuperscript{15}When $K$ has positive off-diagonal elements (i.e., there is common ownership across firms), a solution to this equation with positive quantities is not guaranteed to exist. However, by trying to iteratively solve the equation, we find that (for every year of data) we can solve it with very good approximation ($\nu > 0.999$), where $\nu$ is the correlation between successive iterations of $\ln(q)$).
ready-to-eat cereals (Nevo, 2001), and computers (Goeree, 2008). Specifically, by taking firm-to-firm medians we convert the product-to-product microeconometric elasticities into firm-to-firm elasticities and then compare these to the corresponding GHL estimates for the same year.

The results of this comparison are shown in Table 2 which comes from Pellegrino (2019). The signs of the GHL estimates match those of the corresponding microeconometric estimates for every single firm-firm pair. Furthermore, even though these demand elasticities are untargeted, the GHL estimates also match the magnitudes of the own and cross-price elasticities as a whole and for individual firm pairs.

### 4 Empirical Results

Having set up and validated our demand system and described firm behavior under various alternative competition scenarios we can now measure and evaluate the economy-wide impact of common ownership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Firm $i$</th>
<th>Firm $j$</th>
<th>Micro Estimate</th>
<th>GHL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>-4.320</td>
<td>-5.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Toyota</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>-6.433</td>
<td>-4.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>Toyota</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
<td>Toyota</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
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<td>General Motors</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto</td>
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<td>Toyota</td>
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<td>-4.851</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kellogg’s</td>
<td>Kellogg’s</td>
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<td>-1.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Quaker Oats</td>
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<td>0.023</td>
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<td>Kellogg’s</td>
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<td>0.031</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Quaker Oats</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Apple</td>
<td>Dell</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Dell</td>
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<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
<td>Dell</td>
<td>Dell</td>
<td>-5.570</td>
<td>-5.110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1 Product Similarity and Common Ownership

We first describe the salient features of our data on product similarity and common ownership by visualizing their respective network structures and the relationship between them.

4.1.1 Network Structure of Product Similarity and Common Ownership

Our oligopoly game is characterized by two networks: that of product similarities and that of common ownership. We first visualize the network structure of HP’s product similarity dataset. We employ the widely-used network visualization algorithm of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991, henceforth FR) to reduce the network’s dimensionality from 61,146 (the number of words in the HP’s vocabulary) to two (a bidimensional surface). The FR algorithm models the network nodes as particles and arranges them on a plane. However, the algorithm is sensitive to the initial configuration of nodes and has difficulties visualizing the cluster structure of large networks. We address this well-known problem by pre-arranging the nodes with the OpenOrd algorithm (Martin, Brown, Klavans and Boyack, 2011) which was specifically developed for this purpose, before running the FR algorithm.

Every publicly traded firm in 2008, the mid-point of our sample period, is a dot in each of the two panels of Figure 2. In the left panel, firm pairs with a high cosine product similarity are shown closer and are connected by a thicker line. Two patterns are particularly noteworthy. First, firms are unevenly distributed over the space of product characteristics. In some areas in the left panel of Figure 2 there is a significantly denser population of firms than in other areas. Second, the product similarity network exhibits a distinct community structure: large groups of firms cluster in the same areas of the network.

We repeat the same exercise for the network of ownership links between all the companies in our sample. As before, we reduce the dimensionality of the dataset from 3,126 (the number of investors) to two using the OpenOrd and FR algorithms to visualize the network in the right panel of Figure 2. Firm pairs that have large ownership weights between them are shown closer and are connected by a thicker line. In contrast to the product similarity network depicted in Figure 2 the network does not exhibit a community structure, but instead has a distinct hub-and-spoke structure with a large proportion of firms sharing significant overlap and a remainder of largely unconnected firms at the periphery.

The two networks also evolve over time as shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 in the appendix. The ownership network is dramatically more connected in 2021 than in 1995, a trend documented in detail by Azar (2012) and Backus et al. (2021b). In contrast, the network of product similarities is somewhat more connected in 1995, a trend that is consistent with firms being more differentiated and more insulated from competition in the later part of the sample, as documented by Pellegrino (2019) and Ederer and Pellegrino (2023).

Because both networks are based on time-varying relationships between the different con-
Figure 1: Product Similarity and Profit Weights (2021)

Figure Notes: The figure above is a histogram of the joint distribution of product similarity $a_i \cdot a_j$ and profit weights $\kappa_{ij}$ for all firm $ij$ pairs in 2021.
Figure 2: Network Visualization

Figure Notes: The diagrams are two-dimensional representations of the network of product similarities (left panel), first computed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016), and of the network of ownership shares (right panel). The data include the universe of publicly listed firms in 2008. Firm pairs that are closer in product market space and closer in ownership space, are shown with thicker links. These distances are computed in spaces that have approximately 61,000 and 3,100 dimensions, respectively. We use the OpenOrd algorithm of Martin et al. (2011) and the FR gravity algorithm of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) to plot these high-dimensional objects over a plane.
stituents of the universe of public companies, they are not static networks, but evolve over the course of our study period. However, the two networks differ markedly in their evolution over time. The network of product similarity does not change much as measured by the average value of $a_i a_j$, which is equal to 0.0171 in 1995 and slightly increases to 0.0174 in 2021. In contrast, the average value of $\kappa_{ij}$ is equal to 0.0021 in 1995 but rises almost sevenfold to 0.0146 in 2021.

4.1.2 Relationship between Product Similarity and Common Ownership

A crucial aspect of our empirical analysis is to document the empirical relationship between product similarity $\Sigma$ and common ownership $K$ because this relationship governs the magnitude of the welfare cost of common ownership. As can be seen from the system of first order conditions in equation (2.23) it is the Hadamard product of $K$ and $\Sigma$ that determines how much the realized quantity choices of firms under Cournot competition with common ownership $q^\phi$ differ from the standard benchmarks of standard Cournot without common ownership in equation (2.28) and monopoly in equation (2.27).

Figure 1 plots the histogram of the joint distribution of the product similarity $a_i \cdot a_j$ and the common ownership weight $\kappa_{ij}$ for any firm pair $i$ and $j$ in 2021. Although each product similarity pair $a_i \cdot a_j$ is symmetric, the common ownership weight $\kappa_{ij}$ is not symmetric. We therefore plot each pair of firm $i$ and $j$ twice.

A large proportion of firm pairs has little product similarity and little common ownership between them. The complete absence of overlap is relatively more pronounced in ownership than in product similarity space as evidenced by the discontinuous jump at 0 for $\kappa_{ij}$. However, a sizable proportion of firm pairs overlaps considerably in both product similarity and ownership space. However, there is no clear relationship between product similarity and common ownership. The correlation and rank correlation coefficients for the two variables in 2021 are 0.0264 and 0.0296, respectively, which means that common ownership is not more pronounced for firms that are more similar in product space. This pattern is also apparent when overlaying the two networks as in Figure 10 of the appendix which reveals the differences in cluster structure of these two networks. The pink $K$ network only has one big cluster whereas the blue $A'A$ network has multiple clusters that do not overlap in any particular way with the $K$ network.

Finally, the figure also shows that a small proportion of $\kappa_{ij}$ has values greater than 1. Such values of $\kappa$ exceeding 1 lead to owners placing more weight on the profits of competitor $j$ than on the profits of their own firm $i$. This makes it possible for common ownership to create incentives for the “tunneling” of profits from one firm to another (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer, 2000). However, the proportion of these firms is sufficiently small such that even if we restrict all $\kappa_{ij}$ to be strictly smaller than 1, the estimates of our model are essentially unchanged.
Table 3: Welfare Estimates (2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Statistic</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Profits (US$ trillions)</td>
<td>$\Pi(q)$</td>
<td>8.024</td>
<td>6.079</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>9.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Surplus (US$ trillions)</td>
<td>$CS(q)$</td>
<td>8.511</td>
<td>12.648</td>
<td>21.390</td>
<td>5.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Surplus / Perfect Competition</td>
<td>$\frac{W(q)}{W(q^W)}$</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Profit / Total Surplus</td>
<td>$\frac{\Pi(q)}{W(q)}$</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Surplus / Total Surplus</td>
<td>$\frac{CS(q)}{W(q)}$</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Notes: The table reports the model estimates of aggregate profits, consumer surplus, and total surplus for each of the counterfactual scenarios presented in Section 2.
4.2 Welfare, Consumer Surplus, and Profit Estimates

We now present the results of the empirical estimation of our model. These baseline estimates assume that investors exert influence in proportion to their ownership shares and that firms set quantities in accordance with the objective function given in equation (2.15).

We first compute total surplus and decompose it into profits and consumer surplus as reported in Table 3 for 2021, the most recent year in our sample. These calculations are based on the assumption that the observed equilibrium is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium under common ownership (column 1) of our model in Section 2. In columns 2, 3, and 4 we report the counterfactual estimates based on the alternative model assumptions. Table 4 in the appendix reports the same estimates for 1995, the first year of our sample.

We estimate that in 2021, under Common Ownership, publicly listed firms earn an aggregate economic profit of $8.024 trillion, consumers gain a surplus of $8.511 trillion, and the estimated total surplus is equal to $16.535 trillion. 48.5% of the total surplus produced accrues to companies in the form of oligopoly profits under common ownership while consumers appropriate a slightly bigger share of 51.5% of total surplus.

The estimates for our two primary counterfactuals, Cournot-Nash and Perfect Competition, are reported in column 2 and 3. Comparing the estimates of these counterfactual models with those of the Common Ownership allocation in column 1 shows that the welfare costs of common ownership are significant, but not as large as the welfare costs of oligopoly. First, total surplus is slightly higher at $18.727 trillion under oligopoly without common ownership (Cournot-Nash) and substantially higher at $21.390 trillion under perfect competition. Thus, we estimate that in 2021 the deadweight loss of oligopoly amounts to 12.6% of total surplus. On top of that, common ownership leads to an additional deadweight loss of 10.1% of the total surplus under perfect competition.

Although the effects of oligopoly and common ownership on efficiency are considerable, their respective distributional effects are even more substantial. Under perfect competition consumers capture a much larger share of the total surplus: $21.390 trillion, slightly less than double than in the Cournot-Nash allocation ($12.648 trillion) and more than double under the Common Ownership allocation ($8.511 trillion). This is partly because with constant returns to scale when firms price at marginal cost 100% of the total surplus accrues to consumers. In contrast, merely 67.5% and 51.5% of total surplus accrue to consumers under oligopoly without and with common ownership. Corporate profits, on the other hand, move in the opposite direction. The aggregate profits under common ownership ($8.024 trillion) are about a third larger than those under standard Cournot competition ($6.079 trillion).

The comparison between Common Ownership in column 1 and Cournot-Nash in column 2 further allows us to focus on the distributional effects of common ownership on top of the effect of product market power due to oligopoly. Not only does common ownership in the economy lead to a total welfare loss of $2.192 trillion, but the welfare losses of common ownership fall entirely on consumers. Common ownership lowers consumer surplus by $4.137 trillion from $12.648 trillion to
Figure 3: Total Surplus of U.S. Public Firms

Figure Notes: The figure plots the evolution of aggregate (economic) profits $\Pi(q)$, aggregate consumer surplus $CS(q)$, and total surplus $W(q)$ using the left axis. The right axis shows profits as a percentage of total surplus ($\Pi(q)/W(q)$, black dotted line).

$8.511$ trillion.

In contrast, common ownership raises aggregate profits by $1.945$ trillion from $6.079$ trillion to $8.024$ trillion. This aggregate increase in corporate profits however obscures the fact that common ownership differentially affects corporate profits (net of fixed costs), as can be seen in Table 5 in the appendix which lists the companies that experience the largest profit increases and decreases due to common ownership. This differential impact of common ownership occurs for several reasons. First, as documented in Figure 2 and Figure 1 there is a great deal of heterogeneity in common ownership. Second, the magnitude of the impact of common ownership depends on companies’ position in the network of product market rivalry. Third, when common ownership increases, all firms produce less in the aggregate (raising profits overall), but there is also a reallocation of market shares towards more productive firms. For some unproductive firms the effect of reallocation on profits is negative and sufficiently strong to counteract the broad profit-increasing effects of common ownership. Thus, it is not surprising that some of the largest and most profitable firms in the U.S. economy benefit the most from common ownership relative to the uncoordinated Cournot oligopoly benchmark.

The final counterfactual we analyze is the Monopoly allocation for which we report the welfare estimates in column 4. Recall that under this allocation all firms are controlled by a single decision-maker who coordinates supply choices and maximizes aggregate firm profits. Aggregate surplus is equal to only $15.414$ trillion and thus significantly lower than in the common ownership equilibrium allocation. Despite the decrease in aggregate welfare, profits are markedly higher still at $9.437$ trillion. In contrast, consumer surplus is reduced to just $5.976$ trillion equal to $38.8\%$ of the total
The broad conclusion of our comparative static analysis is that the combination of oligopoly and common ownership of U.S. public firms has considerable effects on allocative efficiency, firm profits, and consumer welfare.

4.3 Time Trends in Welfare, Consumer Surplus, and Profits

We next consider time trends in welfare, consumer surplus, and firm profits based on annual estimates obtained from mapping our model to Compustat data on a yearly basis. We are particularly interested in the welfare implications of the rise of ownership concentration among publicly listed U.S. companies for the period from 1995 to 2021. Because our model uses both HP’s time-varying product similarity data and time-varying ownership, our estimates account for how the product offering of U.S. public firms and their ownership has changed over time.

In Figure 3, we plot annual wage-deflated aggregate consumer surplus $CS(q)$ (dark green area) and profits $\Pi(q)$ (light green area) between 1995 and 2021 for the observed Common Ownership equilibrium. Total surplus $W$ is the combined area of $CS(q)$ and $\Pi(q)$. On the right axis we also plot profits as a share of total surplus $\Pi/W$ (dotted black line).

The wage-deflated total surplus produced by U.S. public corporations increased between 1995 and 2021 from $14.060 trillion to $16.535 trillion. All of the increase over this time period is due to the increase in profits. Profits increased from $2.597 trillion to $8.024 trillion. Consumer surplus decreased from $1.519 trillion in 1995 to $3.314 trillion in 2021. Because of these opposing shifts,
The figure plots the estimated deadweight loss (DWL) of oligopoly and of oligopoly and common ownership, between 1995 and 2021. The dark green line is the DWL of oligopoly, the % difference in total surplus between the Cournot equilibrium and the Perfect Competition scenario. The light green line is the % difference between the Cournot Common Ownership equilibrium and the Perfect Competition scenario.

The profit share increased from 19.4% of total surplus in 1995 to 48.5% in 2021.

To investigate the evolution of the profit share in greater detail and to decompose the separate effects of oligopoly and common ownership we plot the profit share of total surplus under Cournot with and without common ownership in Figure 4. Under standard Cournot without common ownership (dark green line) the increase in the profit share is significantly less pronounced than under Cournot with common ownership (light green line). Under standard Cournot the profit share increases by roughly 15 percentage points from 17.0% to 32.5%. In contrast, the increase in the profit share under common ownership is almost twice as large. The profit share increases by almost 30 percentage points from 19.2% to 48.5%.

Figure 5 plots the respective percentage gains in total surplus when the economy moves from the standard Cournot equilibrium $q^\Psi$ and from the CCO equilibrium $q^\phi$ to the first-best perfect competition equilibrium $q^W$. These are the deadweight losses of oligopoly (dark green line) and of the combination of oligopoly and common ownership (light green line). Their respective trends mimic those of the profit shares of total surplus under both of these regimes. The deadweight losses increase from 7.8% and 9.2% in 1995 to 12.6% and 22.7% in 2021 suggesting increasingly harmful effects of oligopolistic behavior and common ownership.

The primary focus of our paper is the quantification of the welfare impact of common ownership over and above the impact of oligopoly. The left panel of Figure 6 plots the evolution of the dead-
weight loss that is solely due to the presence of common ownership. Specifically, the figure plots the difference between the two lines in Figure 5. This is the difference between the % difference in total surplus between standard Cournot and perfect competition and the % difference in total surplus between Cournot with common ownership and perfect competition. Whereas the deadweight loss attributable to common ownership is relatively modest in 1995 (1.5% of total surplus), it increases about sevenfold over the course of our sample reaching 11.7% of total surplus in 2021. As a result, the increase in deadweight loss under Cournot with common ownership (Figure 5, light green line) from 9.2% in 1995 to 22.7% in 2021 is due in a much larger part to common ownership than to standard oligopoly reasons such as increased concentration or greater product differentiation.

From an antitrust perspective we are particularly interested in the effect of common ownership on consumer surplus and its evolution over time. In the right panel of Figure 6 we plot the effect of common ownership on corporate profits and consumer surplus from 1995 to 2021. Common ownership raised corporate profits by 10.7% in 1995 and by 32.0% in 2021. At the same time, it lowered consumer surplus by 4% in 1995 but by 32.7% in 2021. Although the percentage reduction in consumer surplus is smaller in magnitude than the corresponding increase in profits in 1995, there is still a substantial deadweight loss because profits constitute less than a fifth of total surplus. Similarly, in 2021 even though the profit share under common ownership is close to half of total surplus (see Figure 4 and the respective increase and decrease of profits and consumer surplus are approximately equal in absolute magnitude (see Figure 6), the deadweight loss is still substantial because profits would constitute a markedly smaller share of surplus in the absence of common ownership.

Taken together, our results suggest that, compared to 1995, U.S. public firms have more market power in 2021 due to standard oligopolistic reasons and, more importantly, due to an increase in ownership concentration and overlap. According to our estimates this increase in aggregate market

Figure Notes: The left panel of the figure above plots the deadweight loss from common ownership, measured as the difference in total surplus ($W$) between the Cournot oligopoly allocation and the CCO allocation. The right panel displays the effect of common ownership on profits and consumer surplus, measured as the percentage difference between the Cournot oligopoly allocation and the CCO allocation from 1995 to 2021.
power negatively impacted both allocative efficiency and consumer welfare.

5 Corporate Governance under Common Ownership

We now consider alternative assumptions of corporate governance that lead to different objective functions for the firm. For each of these alternative governance models, we then perform welfare calculations (as we did for the baseline model). This allows us to investigate the sensitivity of our results to these governance assumptions.

5.1 Superproportional Influence of Large Investors

The governance model previously presented assumes that each firm \( i \) maximizes the profit shares of its investors, weighting them in proportion to the stake they own, when setting \( q_i \). However, there are good reasons to believe that larger investors exert influence that exceeds the size of their stake. That is to say, proportional influence as assumed by Rotemberg (1984) may over- or understate the importance of large investors for strategic firm decisions. One reason this might be the case is that corporate voting is more akin to majoritarian rather than proportional representation (Azar and Vives, 2021b).

Suppose that firm \( i \) weights the profits of investor \( z \) by \( s_{iz} \cdot \gamma_{iz} \) (as opposed to \( s_{iz} \)). Here \( \gamma_{iz} \) is an investor “influence” weight that can increase or decrease the weight assigned to a particular investor depending on how large the investor’s stake in company \( i \) is. We can then define the following influence-adjusted common ownership weights, \( \tilde{\kappa}_{ij} \) by

\[
\tilde{\kappa}_{ij} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} \gamma_{iz} s_{jz}}{\sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} \gamma_{iz} s_{iz}}
\]

The analysis of Gilje et al. (2020) suggests that these influence weights are concave in the ownership shares of investors. Consistent with their approach (and with that of Backus et al. 2021b), we approximate this influence function using a square root (i.e., \( \gamma_{iz} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sqrt{s_{iz}} \)).

5.2 Blockholder Thresholds

An alternative way to model the fact that large investors exercise a disproportional level of control over a corporation is to introduce “blockholders.” These are investors who are presumed to actively exercise control on some company \( i \) if their stake in \( i \) exceeds a certain threshold.

The literature typically defines a blockholder as a shareholder holding 5% or more of a company’s stock, due the fact that this level triggers additional SEC disclosure requirements (Edmans and Holderness, 2017). Blockholders have been shown to play an important role in ensuring that there is at least one owner who has the correct incentives to make residual decisions in a way that creates value. Their influence can come through direct intervention in a firm’s operations (otherwise known
as “voice”) and through selling of shares if the firm underperforms (otherwise known as “exit”).

We construct blockholding-consistent common ownership weights, based on the alternative assumption that investors exert influence only when their ownership stake exceeds the 5% blockholder threshold in a company. That is, if some investor $z$ is a blockholder of firm $i$, the firm is assumed to internalize the impact of its production decision on the investor’s portfolio profits. Otherwise, the impact on the investor’s portfolio profits is disregarded and the investor’s portfolio profits are assumed to coincide with the firm’s profit function. Specifically, the manager $i$’s objective function becomes:

$$\phi_i = \pi_i \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} s_{iz} + \sum_{j \neq i} \pi_j \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} b_{iz} s_{jz}$$

(5.2)

where $b_{iz}$ is a dummy variable that identifies whether investor $z$ is a blockholder of company $i$. The blockholder-adjusted common ownership weights are thus given by

$$\tilde{\kappa}_{ij} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} b_{iz} s_{jz}}{\sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} s_{jz}}$$

for $i \neq j$

(5.3)

in line with the SEC’s definition of a “blockholder.” We assume that $b_{iz} = 1$ if and only if $s_{iz} > 5\%$.

5.3 Rational Investor Inattention

One of the assumptions of the governance model previously presented is that each firm $i$ fully internalizes the weighted profit shares of its investors when choosing $q_i$. While intuitively appealing, this assumption may not be entirely realistic. Agency problems between owners and managers may attenuate or even exacerbate the anticompetitive effects of common ownership (Antón et al., 2023b). Similarly, Gilje et al. (2020, henceforth GGL) have highlighted the importance of investor inattention in evaluating the effects of common ownership. Investor attention here refers to the extent to which firm owners incorporate strategic considerations related to common ownership in influencing a company’s decision. The rationale is that monitoring a firm’s management and forcing it to incorporate strategic considerations related to common ownership requires a cost from the investor. Incurring this cost might not be optimal for every investor. This is likely to be the case for firm holdings that constitute only a small portion of a large, diversified investor’s overall portfolio.

Motivated by this consideration, GGL propose a corporate governance model of common ownership, which produces the following alternative measure of firm $i$’s sympathy towards firm $j$:

$$\text{GGL}_{ij}^{\text{full}} \overset{\text{def}}{=} s_i | s_j = \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} s_{jz}$$

(5.4)

Although GGL’s sympathy score differs from the welfare-relevant measure of common ownership in
our structural model \((\kappa_{ij})\), the two metrics are closely related. It can be immediately verified that

\[
\kappa_{ij} = \frac{GGL_{\text{full}}}{IHHI_i}
\]

(5.5)

where \(IHHI_i\) is the investor Herfindahl index of firm \(i\). This specific measure of common ownership, just like \(\kappa_{ij}\), presumes that investors are fully attentive to the product market interactions of the firms in their portfolio. GGL generalize their measure to a setting where investors are allowed to be imperfectly attentive such that sympathy score is given by

\[
GGL_{ij}^{\text{fitted}} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} g_{iz} s_{jz}
\]

(5.6)

where \(g_{iz} \in [0, 1]\) is an “attention weight” which captures the degree to which investor \(z\) internalizes the product market rivalries of firm \(i\). Following Iliev and Lowry (2015)’s approach of using proxy voting data, GGL estimate these attention weights non-parametrically as the probability of investor \(z\) deviating from the voting recommendation issued by the Institutional Shareholders Service (ISS), conditional on the weight of firm \(i\) in investor \(z\)’s portfolio. They find that the higher the weight of firm \(i\) in \(z\)’s portfolio, the higher the likelihood of \(z\) deviating from ISS’s recommendation. The intuition behind this measure is that an inattentive investor will completely delegate their voting choices to ISS and never disagree with their recommendation. The assumption is that ISS itself does not base their voting recommendations on product market rivalry considerations.

We can use the attention weights of GGL to compute a modified \(\kappa_{ij}\) that accounts for imperfect investor attention. To do so, however, we need to make an assumption about the ex-ante probability that a fully-attentive investor disagrees with ISS. Because the disagreement probabilities estimated by GGL top out at 7% (i.e., the probability in the limit case in which a company comprises the entirety of an investor’s portfolio), we assume that 7% is the disagreement probability in the full attention case. This assumption is consistent with investors paying full attention to companies that make up the entirety of their portfolio.

This leads to the following inattention-modified sympathy weight \(\bar{\kappa}_{ij}\) given by

\[
\bar{\kappa}_{ij} \overset{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{0.07} \cdot \frac{GGL_{ij}^{\text{fitted}}}{IHHI_i} = \frac{1}{0.07} \cdot \frac{GGL_{ij}^{\text{fitted}}}{GGL_{ij}^{\text{full}}} \cdot \kappa_{ij} < 0.07
\]

(5.7)

which can be computed using the data of GGL which is available on the WRDS platform.

This measure can be micro-founded with a behavioral corporate governance model in which firm \(i\)’s management discounts investor \(z\)’s share of the competitors’ profits at a rate \(g_{iz}\), which is
consistent with the following objective function for firm $i$:

$$
\phi_i = \pi_i Z \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} s_{iz} + \sum_{j \neq i} \pi_j Z \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz} g_{iz} s_{jz} \quad \text{for } i \neq j
$$

(5.8)

Note that, by construction, $0 \leq \kappa_{ij} \leq \kappa_{ij}$. Therefore, in the framework of GGL, investor inattention dampens the product market effects of common ownership.

One frequent criticism of the common ownership literature is that because many of the largest common owners are passive investors (i.e., investors who follow a passive investing strategy), they cannot and do not affect firm decisions. Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016) empirically investigate whether such passive investors are in fact passive owners (i.e., owners who do not influence firms’ governance). Their analysis suggests that this is a misconception: passive mutual funds play a rather active role in firms’ governance choices and thus passive investing does not necessarily equate with passive ownership.\(^{16}\) Therefore, in our analysis we do not specifically distinguish between active and passive investors.

### 5.4 Governance Frictions and Managerial Entrenchment

Our baseline governance model assumes that when setting $q_i$ the manager of firm $i$ maximizes the profit shares of the firm’s investors, weighting them in proportion to the stake they own. However, in reality the incentives of corporate managers and shareholders are not perfectly aligned because of governance frictions and managerial entrenchment. Azar and Ribeiro (2022, henceforth AR) develop a flexible objective function that allows for partial managerial entrenchment in which the manager $i$’s objective function is given by

$$
\phi \propto \pi + \tau_i \sum_{j \neq i} \kappa_{ij} \pi_j
$$

(5.9)

The mitigation factor $\tau_i$ is equal to

$$
\tau_i = \frac{\gamma \psi IHHI_i}{1 + \gamma \psi IHHI_i}
$$

(5.10)

where $IHHI_i = \sum_{z=1}^{Z} s_{iz}^2$ is the investor Herfindahl concentration index. As is apparent from the equation, the mitigation factor is larger when the cost to managers of shareholder dissent $\gamma$ is higher, the responsiveness of shareholders to managerial behavior $\psi$ is higher, and when shareholder concentration $IHHI_i$ is higher. $\tau_i$ lies between 0 and 1 and thus spans the extreme cases of no internalization ($\tau_i = 0$) and full internalization ($\tau = 1$) and all the partial internalization cases in between.

We consider two specifications highlighted by Azar and Ribeiro (2022). First, we estimate our

\(^{16}\)Furthermore, as Antón et al. (2023b) show both theoretically and empirically, the relative governance passivity of common owners does not imply that there are no anticompetitive product market effects of common ownership.
Figure 7: Common Ownership DWL - Alternative Governance Models

% of Total Surplus


Figure Notes: The figure plots the deadweight loss of common ownership, computed as % of the total surplus, under proportional, superproportional and blockholder influence models, the GGL inattention model, and the AR partial internalization models from 1995 to 2021.

model with a mitigation factor $\tau = 0.29$ that is constant across firms and does not depend on the concentration of shareholder ownership within each firm. Second, we use the best-fitting structural AR specification in which the mitigation factor varies across firms and is given by

$$\tau_i = \frac{\exp[\theta_0 + \log(IHH_i)]}{1 + \exp[\theta_0 + \log(IHH_i)]}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.11)$$

and $\theta_0 = \log(\gamma \psi) = 2.6844$. This yields a median mitigation factor equal to 0.29.

5.5 Empirical Results

We now compare the results of these alternative governance assumptions to our benchmark case which assumes Rotemberg (i.e., proportional) common ownership weights.

In Figure 7 we plot the evolution of the deadweight loss that is due to the presence of common ownership under different governance assumptions. Whereas superproportional influence of large investors leads to a deadweight loss that is quite similar though slightly larger than under proportional common ownership throughout our sample, the effect of common ownership with blockholder thresholds is much smaller in the early years of our sample. Until 2013 the deadweight loss of blockholder common ownership is well below 0.5% of total surplus. However, after that it rises rapidly to as high as 9% of total surplus at the end of our sample period. This is in large part due to the increasingly large ownership stakes of the biggest asset management companies in all publicly listed
firms. Until the mid-2010s their ownership stakes rarely exceeded the 5% blockholder threshold, but by the end of the sample they constitute the top shareholders for almost all publicly listed firms. For example, today both BlackRock and Vanguard are among the top five shareholders of almost 70 percent of the largest 2,000 publicly traded firms in the U.S. whereas twenty years ago that number was zero percent for both firms (Fichtner, Heemskerk and Garcia-Bernardo, 2017).

The deadweight loss estimates of common ownership under the GGL inattention model hover at around 1% of total surplus at the beginning of our sample. The estimates then increase in tandem with proportional influence models, though at a slower pace. Even under GGL inattention, common ownership leads to a deadweight loss of about 9% of total surplus, much higher than in 1995. One caveat of our empirical implementation of the GGL inattention model is that GGL’s data are only available up to 2012. For the years following 2012 we have to use the 2012 attention weights. This means that while the modified sympathy weights $\bar{\kappa}_{ij}$ still capture the increase in ownership concentration that takes place in this period, they fail to reflect changes in (in)attention that may have taken place at the same time.

Finally, perhaps the most realistic model of corporate governance under common ownership is the AR partial internalization model with uniform or firm-specific mitigation parameters. The estimated deadweight loss of common ownership using either of these models is small and quite similar, though slightly higher, to the blockholder influence model at the beginning of the sample. However, it does not rise nearly as dramatically. Using both uniform and firm-specific mitigation parameters we find that the estimated deadweight loss of common ownership is approximately 3%.

In Figure 8 similar patterns emerge for the distributional consequences of common ownership on firm profits (left panel) and consumer surplus (right panel). Common ownership with superproportional influence leads to essentially identical increases in profits and decreases in consumer surplus as our benchmark case with Rotemberg proportional weights. Common ownership with blockholder influence thresholds have little impact on either measure until about 2012. However, even
with blockholder thresholds common ownership raises firm profits by almost 5% of total surplus and lowers consumer surplus by almost 13% in 2021. Under GGL governance assumptions common ownership has more muted distributional consequences. Common ownership modestly raises firm profits by approximately 2%, but still leads to a significant reduction of consumer surplus of almost 7% in 2021.

Thus, under various corporate governance assumptions common ownership leads to a sizeable deadweight loss that is increasing over time as well as to considerable distributional consequences that transfer rents from consumers to producers.

6 Extensions and Discussion

6.1 Private and Foreign Firms

Our empirical analysis so far has focused on publicly listed U.S. firms and has excluded foreign and privately held firms because the product similarity and ownership data for these firms is not as readily available. To circumvent these data problems our model can be extended to include a continuum of atomistic firms which do not share any ownership overlap with public firms. We assume that there is a continuum of atomistic firms that behave competitively and can enter and exit endogenously. The atomistic firms are ranked according to a productivity distribution and the active atomistic firms are those above a productivity cut-off value in the style of Hopenhayn (1992).

For the sake of expositional simplicity, assume that the atomistic companies can be aggregated into a single representative firm. In our empirical implementation rather than just adding a single representative firm for all the private and foreign firms in the entire economy we add one representative firm for each of thirty macro-sectors. Variations in the size of the representative firm reflect the intensive margin of production as well as the extensive margin (i.e., the entry and exit of atomistic firms). We index this representative firm $i = n + 1$ and add a row and a column to the matrices $A'$, $K$, and $\Delta$ and one row to the vectors $b$ and $c$.

Because this representative firm behaves competitively, its first order condition differs from that of granular firms $\{1, 2, ..., n\}$. Recall that the first order condition for a granular firm is given by

$$\phi'(q_i) = 0.$$ (6.1)

In contrast, the representative firm prices at marginal cost and therefore maximizes total surplus $W(q)$. Thus, its first order condition is given by

$$W'(q_i) = 0 \quad \text{for} \quad i = n + 1.$$ (6.2)

We can combine the first order conditions for granular firms and the representative firm in the
following way:

$$0 = (b - c^0) - (I + G + \Delta + \Sigma + K \circ \Sigma) q$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.3)$$

where $G$ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are equal to 1 for granular firms 1 to $n$ and equal to 0 for the atomistic firm $n+1$. We assume that all private and foreign firms (and hence the representative firm) do not have any common ownership with any of the granular firms. As a result, $K$ is as before but contains an additional row and column in which all off-diagonal elements are equal to zero:

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad K = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \kappa_{12} & \cdots & \kappa_{1n} & 0 \\ \kappa_{21} & 1 & \cdots & \kappa_{2n} & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \kappa_{n1} & \kappa_{n2} & \cdots & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.4)$$

The equilibrium quantity vector under common ownership is now given by

$$q^d = (I + G + \Delta + \Sigma + K \circ \Sigma)^{-1} (b - c^0).$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.5)$$

To empirically implement this robustness check we use data from the Compustat Historical Segments database to construct a measure of the domestic sales share for Compustat companies. We scale down all of Compustat firms’ income statement data (revenues, costs) using the domestic sales share. We then estimate the share of US final demand served by private and foreign firms which identifies the equilibrium size of these representative firms. We use the OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA) dataset to compute US final demand (value added) for 30 macro-sectors. These macro-sectors are broad ISIC v3.1 classifications, an international harmonized classification that is used by the OECD for its TiVA database. We then subtract from this estimate the percentage share of final demand served by US public firms, which we estimate by dividing the domestic sales revenues of Compustat firms by the final demand (computed as gross output, plus imports less exports).

We localize the representative firms in the product characteristic space by complementing HP’s product similarity data with another database developed in Frésard, Hoberg and Phillips (2020) that uses textual descriptions of industries from the 2005 BEA Input-Output tables. Specifically, they construct measures of cosine similarity between products and BEA sectors. We apply these cosine similarities to ISIC v3.1 industries by developing a crosswalk between BEA and ISIC v3.1.

With these measures we take the extended model to the data and again estimate the welfare and distributional impact of oligopoly and common ownership. Our estimates are shown in Figure 9. Although the addition of these representative firms significantly changes our estimates of the deadweight loss of Cournot oligopoly relative to the perfect competition benchmark, our estimates for the respective effects of common ownership are largely unchanged. This is due to our assumption
that the ownership of public firms is distinct from that of private and foreign firms.

### 6.2 Multi-product Firms

We now relax the assumption that all firms in the model are single-product firms. To do so, we augment the number of products in the economy to \( \hat{n} \geq n \) and allow the \( n \) firms to produce more than one product. Importantly though, we assume that each product is still produced by only one firm. The product similarity matrix is now given by \( \hat{\Sigma} \) and has dimension \( \hat{n} \times \hat{n} \).

We denote the augmented ownership matrix by \( \hat{K} \). This matrix is symmetric and has dimension \( \hat{n} \times \hat{n} \). \( \hat{K} \) has a simple structure. Its \((i,j)\) entry \( \hat{k}_{ij} \) is equal to one if product \( i \) and \( j \) are produced by the same firm. Otherwise, \( \hat{k}_{ij} \) is equal to the \( k_{ij} \) computed based on the shareholder ownership stakes of the two firms that produce products \( i \) and \( j \). The equilibrium quantity vector under common ownership is now given by

\[
q^\phi = \left( I + \Delta + \hat{\Sigma} + \hat{K} \circ \hat{\Sigma} \right)^{-1} \left( b - c^0 \right).
\]

For our empirical implementation we use Compustat segments data to break down the sales of a large subset of the firms in the Compustat sample by business segments. Each of these segments is associated with a SIC code. We define a product as a subset of segments associated with the same 4-digit SIC code and model firms that report sales across multiple segments with distinct SIC codes as multi-product firms. We break down their operations among products using their Compustat segments sales share and use the association between products and firms to find the augmented ownership matrix \( \hat{K} \).

Next we construct the augmented product similarity matrix \( \hat{\Sigma} \). Following previous work by Hoberg and Phillips (2018) who combine firm-level cosine similarities and segment SIC codes, we build a cosine similarity matrix for products/segments denoted by \( (A'A)_p \) rather than for firms \( (A'A)_F \) as we have done so far. The exact step-by-step procedure is provided in Pellegrino (2019). Loosely speaking, to compute the similarity of a product \( i \) with respect to any other product, we are combining the 10-K description of the firm selling product \( i \) with those of all other firms that sell in \( i \)'s SIC code, weighting them by their respective sales shares.

### 6.3 Physical Complements

The GHL demand system assumes that all goods in the economy are physical imperfect substitutes or independent products and that there are no physical complements. This restriction is due to the fact that the \( A'A \) matrix is non-negative by construction and hence \( \Sigma \) is also non-negative. Physical complements would be represented by negative entries in the \( \Sigma \) matrix.

In the presence of physical complementarities between products \( i \) and \( j \), oligopolistic behavior still leads to an undersupply of goods \( i \) and \( j \) because the firms do not internalize the positive spillovers that their own products have on complementary goods. However, common ownership
between firms $i$ and $j$ partially resolves this inefficiency and thus has a pro-competitive rather than an anti-competitive effect. Because the framework of Hoberg and Phillips (2016) on which our empirical implementation rests, limits us to a non-negative $A'A$ matrix, our estimates of the welfare cost of common ownership are upwardly biased if products are in fact physical complements.

Although we cannot measure physical complements directly we can nonetheless investigate how sensitive our results are to the presence of physical complements. For every year of observation, we randomly select five percent of product pairs $i$ and $j$ and flip the sign of their corresponding elements in the product similarity matrix $\Sigma$ such that $\sigma_{ij} = -\sigma_{ji} < 0$, thereby creating artificial physical complements. We then re-estimate our models with this altered product similarity matrix.

### 6.4 Consumption Baskets of Corporate Managers

A limiting assumption of our baseline model is that corporate managers are assumed to spend all of their income on a luxury good. Thus, each manager’s consumption basket is assumed to be entirely distinct from that of the representative consumer-worker-owner. It is therefore natural to ask how our conclusions would change if corporate managers instead consumed some of the goods consumed by the representative agent.

The manager of firm $i$ chooses his consumption bundle of oligopolistically-produced goods $q^i$ to maximize utility

$$\max_{q^i} U^i = b'q^i - \frac{1}{2\rho \varepsilon} q^i' (I + \Sigma) q^i + \ell$$

$$\text{st. } p'q^i + \ell \leq \varepsilon \phi_i$$

(6.7)

(6.8)

where $\ell$ is the luxury good produced only through labor with a linear production technology and $\rho \in [0, 1]$ is a parameter that controls the correlation of the manager’s taste with that of the representative consumer. Furthermore, $\phi_i$ is the normalized shareholder income for firm $i$ and $\varepsilon$ is the (arbitrarily small) manager’s share of these portfolio profits.

From the utility function the manager’s inverse demand is

$$p = b - \frac{1}{\rho \varepsilon} (I + \Sigma) q^i$$

(6.9)

which implies that

$$q^i = \rho \varepsilon q.$$  

(6.10)

Because demand is quasi-linear we have

$$\ell = \varepsilon \phi_i - p'q^i.$$  

(6.11)
Substituting the expressions for $\ell$ and $q^i$ in the manager’s utility function we obtain

$$U^i = \rho \varepsilon \left[ q' (b - p) - \frac{1}{2} q' (I + \Sigma) q \right] + \varepsilon \phi_i$$

which we can rewrite as

$$U^i \propto \rho CS + \phi_i \quad (6.13)$$

where we used the definition for consumer surplus from equation (2.7).

The parameter $\rho$ captures the extent to which the consumption basket of the manager loads on non-luxury goods. The more the manager consumes non-luxury goods, the more they will internalize consumer surplus. If $\rho = \kappa_{ij} = 1$ for all $i, j$ pairs then each corporate manager maximizes total surplus. In contrast, if $\rho = 0$, we are back to our baseline case and the manager only maximizes weighted shareholder portfolio profits $\phi_i$.

### 6.5 Decreasing Returns to Scale

Recall that in our baseline model each firm’s cost function is quadratic

$$h_i = f_i + c^0_i q_i + \frac{1}{2} \delta_i q_i^2. \quad (6.14)$$

Our analysis so far assumed that firms have constant marginal costs, $\delta_i = 0$, which is a common assumption in the industrial organization literature. We now relax this assumption.

We follow the approach of Pellegrino (2019) of bounding the $\delta_i$ parameter using a set identification result that is specific to this quadratic cost function. This result requires the assumption that the marginal cost function respects non-negativity ($c_i \geq 0$) and non-increasing returns to scale ($\partial c_i / \partial q_i \geq 0$) and only applies to firms for which observed revenues are at least twice total variables costs. We further assume, like DEU, that the parameter controlling the scale elasticity $\delta_i$ is the same for all firms that belong to the same sector (2-digit NAICS). With these assumptions in hand we have

$$\delta_{S(i)} \leq \min_{i' \in S(i) \cap F} \frac{2 \times TVC_i}{p_i q_i - 2 \times TVC_i} \quad (6.15)$$

where $S(i)$ is the set of firms in the sector to which firm $i$ belongs and $F$ is the set of firms whose revenues are at least twice total variable costs. We use this upper bound for $\delta_i$ because assigning any lower value to this parameter would just yield estimates that are closer to those of our baseline model where $\delta_i = 0$. Figures 13 to 18 in the appendix show the distribution and evolution over time of the implied markups and compare them to those estimated by Pellegrino (2019) and De Loecker et al. (2020).
6.6 Geography and Tradable Industries

One of the limitations of our approach is that it does not differentiate between geographical markets within the United States. This is because we use the data of Hoberg and Phillips (2016) who omit geographical words including country and state names, as well as the names of the top fifty cities in the US and in the world. However, as they discuss in their paper, their results are robust to altering these word exclusions.

Although we cannot obtain information on the geographic breakdown of sales within the United States, we can nonetheless provide evidence that our results are not the artifact of ignoring geography. Specifically, we can estimate our model using only firms in tradable sectors and thus excluding firms in non-tradable sectors for which exact geographic locations (both their own and those of their competitors) are much more important. In Figure 9 we show that our results are largely unchanged compare to our baseline.

6.7 Empirical Results

We now compare the results of these various extensions (using proportional Rotemberg common ownership weights throughout) to our benchmark case which assumes no private or foreign firms, only single-product firms, only substitutes, constant returns to scale, and no overlap in the consumption baskets of corporate managers and the representative agent.

In Figure 9 we plot the evolution of the deadweight loss that is due to the presence of common ownership under different extensions of our model. For all specifications we assume that firms use Rotemberg proportional common ownership weights as in our baseline model. First, our results providing evidence for the large and growing welfare impact of common ownership continue to hold across all of our extensions. The estimated deadweight losses in 1995 range between 0.7% and 1.7% of total surplus, but rise to between 7% and 13% by 2021 (or 2019, the last year for which data for representative private and foreign firms are available). Second, most of our extensions, in particular multi-product firms, decreasing returns to scale, physical complements, tradable industries, and a 25% consumption basket overlap, lead to very similar results as our baseline model. For four of these extensions the deadweight loss is slightly lower than in our baseline model whereas with multi-product firms it is slightly larger. Third, the only extension that leads to markedly different results (though they still follow the same time trend) is when we account for the presence of private and foreign firms. In this extension, the deadweight loss is only about half as large as under our baseline.

This lower deadweight loss when we account for private and foreign firms is due to three facts. First, the relative share of the surplus generated by private and foreign firms increases over time in our sample due to a reduction in the number of public firms. Second, and more importantly, private and foreign firms are assumed to be independently owned and thus the secular increase in common ownership does not tamper their competitive behavior. Third, the rise of common ownership leads
Figure 9: Common Ownership DWL - Extensions

Figure Notes: The figure plots the deadweight loss of common ownership, computed as % of the total surplus with multi-product firms, private and foreign firms, only tradable industries, decreasing returns to scale, physical complements, and a 25% overlap in the consumption baskets of corporate managers and the representative agent. All estimates assume that firms use Rotemberg proportional common ownership weights.

to a supply reduction of the commonly-owned firms which, given the strategic substitutability under Cournot competition, in turn induces private and foreign firms to expand output thus mitigating the deadweight loss of common ownership.

Thus, under various extensions, our conclusion that common ownership leads to a increasingly sizeable deadweight loss as well as to considerable distributional consequences that transfer rents from consumers to producers continues to hold. Even our most conservative estimates which result from using the Azar and Ribeiro (2022) mitigation parameter model and accounting for the presence of private and foreign firms, suggest a deadweight loss of approximately 2% of total surplus.

6.8 Bertrand Oligopoly

Our analysis deliberately focuses on Cournot competition because we obtain a model that is both tractable and flexible. All of our analyses can be replicated under the assumption of Bertrand competition. However, the Bertrand case is significantly less tractable, more computationally involved, and the resulting equilibrium equations are harder to interpret. In Appendix B we derive the Bertrand equilibrium with common ownership for the case with a flat marginal cost function (i.e., $\Delta = 0$).

Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider how our results would change if we assumed that firms competed on price as opposed to quantity. Because Bertrand competition in our model is more
intense than Cournot competition and hence results in higher equilibrium quantities, the deadweight loss from oligopoly is smaller when firms set prices rather than quantities. However, because the monopoly solution is independent of whether prices or quantities are chosen and common ownership moves the economy closer to the monopoly potential, the incremental anticompetitive effect of common ownership relative to the standard oligopoly solution is more pronounced under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. Hence, our estimates of the deadweight loss of common ownership obtained under Cournot competition are more conservative.

6.9 Limitations

In our analysis we assume a particular form of firm conduct (i.e., quantity choices in Cournot product market oligopoly) and therefore focus on a particular set of welfare implications of common ownership (i.e., static unilateral effects on product market rivalry). However, there are several other firm decisions which are affected by common ownership. For example, recent theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that common ownership may also affect labor market power (Azar and Vives, 2021a), incentives to collude (Pawliczek, Skinner and Zechman, 2019; Shekita, 2021), firm productivity and cost efficiency (Antón et al., 2023b), innovation (Antón et al., 2018; López and Vives, 2019; Eldar et al., 2020; Li et al., 2020), entry (Newham et al., 2019; Xie and Gerakos, 2020), and the ownership structure of companies (Piccolo and Schneemeier, 2020; Antón, Ederer, Giné and Pellegrino, 2023a). In addition, common ownership may affect firms’ product differentiation choices.

Although the quantification of these additional channels through which common ownership ultimately affects outcomes across the entire economy suggests several fruitful research opportunities, a formal investigation of these channels using our current theoretical framework and empirical methodology is beyond the remit of this paper. Nonetheless, we can conjecture how these additional considerations might affect our conclusions about the welfare impact of common ownership.

First, the labor market power resulting from common ownership (Azar and Vives, 2021a) would lead to wage markdown, lower employment, and lower output thus further increasing the deadweight loss of common ownership that we estimate in the paper. Second, common ownership can facilitate both tacit and explicit collusion (Pawliczek et al., 2019; Shekita, 2021) which would further restrict quantities and increase deadweight loss. Third, common ownership can lead to lower managerial incentives and reduced firm productivity (Antón et al., 2023b) generating additional welfare losses. Fourth, common ownership can have a pro-competitive and welfare-increasing effect if it leads firms to internalize the positive spillovers of privately costly innovation (Antón et al., 2018; López and Vives, 2019) which in turn would improve firm productivity and increase output. This would imply that our results overestimate the welfare losses of common ownership. Fifth, the welfare effects of common ownership due to changes in entry decisions (Newham et al., 2019; Xie and Gerakos, 2020) and ownership arrangements (Piccolo and Schneemeier, 2020) are generally ambiguous and thus it is difficult to hypothesize how considering these choices would affect our conclusions. Finally, by
taking product positioning as exogenous we do not capture the (pro-competitive) effect of common ownership that reduces firms’ product differentiation incentives and leads firms to be in closer competition to each other than they would be in the absence of common ownership.

7 Conclusions

In this paper we provide the first quantification of the welfare and distributional effects of common ownership at the macroeconomic rather than just the industry level. We develop a general equilibrium model of oligopoly in which firms are connected through two large networks of product similarity and ownership overlap. Our baseline empirical estimates indicate that the rise of common ownership led to considerable deadweight losses. In addition, the increase in common ownership resulted in a significantly lower share of total surplus accruing to consumers. The key insights of our findings also continue to hold under alternative corporate governance assumptions such as superproportional influence, blockownership thresholds, limited investor attention, and managerial entrenchment as well as for a range of extensions. The economically large impact of common ownership in several industries across the entire economy as well as its continuing increase suggest that antitrust policy and financial regulation will have to address this new challenge.

However, our analysis focuses on a specific channel through which common ownership among firms affects the size and the distribution of surplus in the U.S. economy and does not consider the impact of common ownership through other channels such as labor market power, innovation, entry, productivity, and product positioning. We leave the quantification of these additional channels as well as the evaluation of policy proposals aimed at curtailing the anticompetitive effects of common ownership to future research.

References


\textbf{Figure 10: Combined Network Visualization}

\textbf{Figure Notes:} The diagram is a two-dimensional representation of the networks of product similarities (blue) and of the network of ownership shares (pink). The data cover the universe of publicly listed firms in 2021. Firm pairs that are closer in product market space and closer in ownership space, are shown with thicker links. These distances are computed in spaces that have approximately 61,000 and 3,100 dimensions, respectively. We use the OpenOrd algorithm of Martin et al. (2011) and the FR gravity algorithm of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) to plot these high-dimensional objects over a plane.
Figure 11: Network Evolution - Product Similarity

Figure Notes: The diagrams are two-dimensional representations of the network of product similarities in 1995 (left panel) and 2021 (right panel). To ensure comparability we hold the position of firms on the graph fixed which involves including firms that may not operate in that particular year. Firm pairs that are closer in product market space are shown with thicker links. These distances are computed in a space that has approximately 61,000 dimensions. We use the OpenOrd algorithm of Martin et al. (2011) and the FR gravity algorithm of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) to plot these high-dimensional objects over a plane.
Figure Notes: The diagrams are two-dimensional representations of the network of ownership shares in 1995 (left panel) and 2021 (right panel). To ensure comparability we hold the position of firms on the graph fixed which involves including firms that may not operate in that particular year. Firm pairs that are closer in ownership space, are shown with thicker links. These distances are computed in a space that has approximately 3,100 dimensions, respectively. We use the OpenOrd algorithm of Martin et al. (2011) and the FR gravity algorithm of Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) to plot these high-dimensional objects over a plane.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Statistic</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Profits (US$ trillions)</td>
<td>$\Pi(q)$</td>
<td>2.691</td>
<td>2.432</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>6.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Surplus (US$ trillions)</td>
<td>$CS(q)$</td>
<td>11.369</td>
<td>11.842</td>
<td>15.487</td>
<td>4.354</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Surplus / Perfect Competition</td>
<td>$\frac{W(q)}{W(q^W)}$</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.922</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.719</td>
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<td>Aggregate Profit / Total Surplus</td>
<td>$\frac{\Pi(q)}{W(q)}$</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.609</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumer Surplus / Total Surplus</td>
<td>$\frac{CS(q)}{W(q)}$</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.391</td>
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</table>

**Table Notes:** The table reports the model estimates of aggregate profits, consumer surplus, and total surplus for each of the counterfactual scenarios presented in Section 2.
Table 5: Difference between CCO and Cournot Profits for Selected Companies

Top 10 Companies ranked by $ profit difference net of fixed costs (in millions), 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>CCO Profits</th>
<th>Cournot Profits</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>% Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft</td>
<td>$ 178,339.5</td>
<td>$ 155,910.0</td>
<td>$ 22,429.5</td>
<td>+14.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walmart</td>
<td>$ 156,347.8</td>
<td>$ 134,282.8</td>
<td>$ 22,064.9</td>
<td>+16.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphabet</td>
<td>$ 214,763.8</td>
<td>$ 199,042.2</td>
<td>$ 15,721.7</td>
<td>+7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>$ 120,614.5</td>
<td>$ 107,863.5</td>
<td>$ 12,751.0</td>
<td>+11.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verizon</td>
<td>$ 107,594.0</td>
<td>$ 95,064.1</td>
<td>$ 12,529.9</td>
<td>+13.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dell</td>
<td>$ 37,263.8</td>
<td>$ 24,776.4</td>
<td>$ 12,487.4</td>
<td>+50.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oracle</td>
<td>$ 45,213.4</td>
<td>$ 33,866.3</td>
<td>$ 11,347.0</td>
<td>+33.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>$ 227,974.2</td>
<td>$ 217,351.7</td>
<td>$ 10,622.5</td>
<td>+4.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS</td>
<td>$ 61,598.8</td>
<td>$ 50,987.5</td>
<td>$ 10,611.2</td>
<td>+20.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Depot</td>
<td>$ 58,428.5</td>
<td>$ 47,825.9</td>
<td>$ 10,602.6</td>
<td>+22.17%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Bottom 10 Companies ranked by $ profit difference net of fixed costs (in millions), 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Name</th>
<th>CCO Profits</th>
<th>Cournot Profits</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>% Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solaredge</td>
<td>$ 781.4</td>
<td>$ 1,446.0</td>
<td>-$ 664.6</td>
<td>-45.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciena</td>
<td>$ 2,070.3</td>
<td>$ 2,827.4</td>
<td>-$ 757.2</td>
<td>-26.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five9</td>
<td>$ 312.3</td>
<td>$ 1,155.4</td>
<td>-$ 843.1</td>
<td>-72.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Broadband</td>
<td>$ 828.1</td>
<td>$ 1,942.7</td>
<td>-$ 1,114.5</td>
<td>-57.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastec</td>
<td>$ 1,711.6</td>
<td>$ 2,908.6</td>
<td>-$ 1,197.0</td>
<td>-41.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palo Alto Networks</td>
<td>$ 2,728.2</td>
<td>$ 3,949.9</td>
<td>-$ 1,221.6</td>
<td>-30.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEG</td>
<td>$ 622.2</td>
<td>$ 1,882.9</td>
<td>-$ 1,260.8</td>
<td>-66.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etsy</td>
<td>$ 1,982.8</td>
<td>$ 3,247.1</td>
<td>-$ 1,264.3</td>
<td>-38.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generac Holdings</td>
<td>$ 1,914.6</td>
<td>$ 3,369.1</td>
<td>-$ 1,454.6</td>
<td>-43.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulta Beauty</td>
<td>$ 2,394.6</td>
<td>$ 3,919.2</td>
<td>-$ 1,524.6</td>
<td>-38.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 13: Implied Markup Distribution

Figure Notes: The figure plots the distribution of firm markups estimated by our model with decreasing returns to scale under common ownership in 1995 and 2021.

Figure 14: Evolution of Markup Percentiles

Figure Notes: The figure plots the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of firm markups estimated by our model with decreasing returns to scale under common ownership from 1995 to 2021.
Figure 15: Comparison of Markups with Pellegrino (2019)

Figure Notes: The figure plots the distribution of firm markups estimated by our model with decreasing returns to scale under common ownership and by Pellegrino (2019) in 2021, the most recent year of our and his sample.

Figure 16: Comparison of Markups with De Loecker et al. (2020)

Figure Notes: The figure plots the distribution of firm markups estimated by our model with decreasing returns to scale under common ownership and by De Loecker et al. (2020) in 2016, the most recent year of their sample.
**Figure 17: Comparison of Markup Evolution with De Loecker et al. (2020)**

![Graph showing the comparison of markup evolution](image1)

**Figure Notes:** The figure plots the revenue-weighted average markup estimated by our model with decreasing returns to scale under common ownership and by De Loecker et al. (2020) using the most recent available year for each firm.

**Figure 18: Cross-sectional Comparison of Markups with De Loecker et al. (2020)**

![Graph showing the cross-sectional comparison of markups](image2)

**Figure Notes:** The figure plots the markups estimated by our model with decreasing returns to scale under common ownership against those estimated by De Loecker et al. (2020) in 2016, the most recent year of their sample. We only use firms that are present in both datasets.
B Bertrand Oligopoly with Common Ownership

In this appendix we derive the Common Ownership Bertrand-Nash equilibrium under the simplifying assumption $\Delta = 0$ (that is, under the assumption that all firms have a flat marginal cost function). We start by writing the vector of profit functions as a function of prices:

$$\pi = \text{diag}(p - c) \left[ D (b - p) + O (b - p) \right]$$

(B.1)

where $D$ and $O$ are, respectively, the matrices containing the diagonal and the off-diagonal elements of the matrix $(I + \Sigma)^{-1}$. We use the bar symbol ($\bar{p}$) to indicate that firm $i$ takes the prices of all other firms $j$ as given. Then the system of first order condition is:

$$0 = [D (b - p) + O (b - p)] - Dp + Dc$$

(B.2)

The Bertrand equilibrium is the fixed point $p = \bar{p}$. By imposing this equality and re-writing this equation system in terms of the quantity vector ($q$) we obtain:

$$D (b - c) = q + D (I + \Sigma) q + (K \circ O) [b - c - (I + \Sigma) q]$$

(B.3)

We finally solve for the Bertrand equilibrium quantity vector $q^B$:

$$q^B = \left[ I + D^{-1} + \Sigma + D^{-1} (K \circ O) (I + \Sigma) \right]^{-1} \left[ I + D^{-1} (K \circ O) \right] (b - c)$$

(B.4)